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Consumer credit Credit provided for personal, household or domestic purposes. 
Consumer protection Ensuring that the best interests of consumers are protected, 
with regulated firms focused on delivering the right consumer 
outcomes. 
[Source: paraphrased from the Central Bank of Ireland Strategic Plan 2016 – 2018] 
Default interest rate The interest rate with which the amount of money concerning 
capital due after default is calculated (i.e. charges for non-
compliance, late payment or interest charged on overdue 
payment). 
 [Source: iff/ZEW 2010 report] 
Interest rate restriction Absolute or relative rate ceilings (fixed administratively, by 
statute or court rulings); Laws designed to prevent exploitation 
and unfair competition with effects on credit cost; Capped 
default interest rates and early repayment fees; Restrictions on 
the compounding of interest and the use of variable rates; Other 
forms of restrictions to the level or rate of interest including 
moral consensus; Anti-Trust regulation. 
[Source: iff/ZEW 2010 report] 
 
Financial inclusion Financial inclusion means that individuals and businesses have 
access to useful and affordable financial products and services 
that meet their needs. 
     
  [Source: World Bank 2017] 
Financial exclusion Financial exclusion means that people encounter difficulties 
accessing and/or using financial services and products that are 
appropriate to their needs  
 
Legal interest rate The interest rate provided by statute to be used when no 
contract or agreement exists between the parties. Sometimes 
referred to as the statutory interest rate 
[Source: iff/ZEW 2010 report] 
Moneylender A moneylender is defined as a person who carries on the 
business of moneylending or who advertises or announces 
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himself or holds himself out in any way as carrying on that 
business, but does not include: any pawnbroker in respect of 
business carried on by him in accordance with the provisions of 
the Pawnbrokers Act, 1964 (as amended by Part XV); a society 
which is registered as a credit union under the Industrial and 
Provident Societies Acts, 1893 to 1978, by virtue of the Credit 
Union Act, 1966; a registered society within the meaning of the 
Friendly Societies Acts, 1896 to 1977; a credit institution; a 
person who supplies money for the purchase, sale or hire of 
goods at an APR which is less than 23% (or such other rate as 
may be prescribed); a mortgage lender. 
[Source: Consumer Credit Act, 1995] 
Moneylending agreement A credit agreement into which a moneylender enters or offers to 
enter, with a consumer in which one or more of the following 
apply: 1. The agreement was concluded away from the business 
premises of the moneylender or the business premises of the 
supplier of goods or services under the agreement; 2. Any 
negotiations for, or in relation to the credit were conducted at a 
place other than the business premises of the moneylender or 
the business premises of the supplier of goods or services under 
the agreement; 3. Repayments under the agreement will, or 
may, be paid by the consumer to the moneylender or his 
representative at any place other than the business premises of 
the moneylender or the business premises of the supplier of 
goods or services under the agreement; or 4. Where the total 
cost of credit to the consumer under the agreement is in excess 
of an APR of 23%., or such other rate as may be prescribed. 
[Source: Consumer Credit Act, 1995] 




Disclaimer:  The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the funders.  
  





The aim of this report is to examine the extent and variety of interest rate restrictions within 
the EU and further afield with a view to assessing the appropriateness of introducing such a 
restriction in the Irish market given its specific circumstances and financial environment. 
Moneylending is a form of lending which is legislated for and is subject to authorisation and 
regulation within the boundaries of the relevant legislative provisions. All licensed 
moneylenders in Ireland are currently subject to a restriction on their maximum APR and total 
cost of credit. They are currently licensed to charge up to 188.45% excluding collection 
charges and up to 287.72% including collection charges. It is important to note the distinction 
between interest rates and annual percentage rates (APRs). The latter shows the true cost of 
the loan as it includes both the interest and any fees and charges. It is important to note also 
that the shorter the term of the loan the higher the APR. Convenience and ease of access are 
often cited as the reasons why consumers engage with moneylenders, despite the high cost of 
moneylending credit. However, while it is convenient for the individual, there is a higher than 
necessary cost for the individual, their family and the wider community. The overall remit of 
policy, legislation and regulation should be to widen existing alternatives such as credit unions 
and the Personal Microcredit Scheme.  
It is in this context that the appropriateness of continuing a legislative provision that, from a 
customer viewpoint, allows extremely high interest rates and charges to be levied on those 
who can least afford to pay them can now be questioned. It is acknowledged that the success 
of any legislative change requires an accompanying infrastructure that will serve as the 
mainstream alternative to the moneylending sources of credit. The overall remit of policy, 
legislation and regulation should be to encourage and support existing alternatives, such as 
credit unions, which are currently the only and practical alternative. 
Moneylending industry in Ireland 
There are 39 licensed moneylending firms in Ireland, 31 of which are categorised as home 
collection credit firms. Currently, these licensed moneylending firms provide high-cost credit 
to about 7% of the Irish population, have outstanding loans currently valued at about €153 
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million and hold a market share of 1.7% for consumer credit. Most commonly, loans are 
offered over 9 months with an APR of 125%. Average loan size is €566. The main feature of 
the business model involves calling to the customers’ homes on a weekly basis to collect loan 
repayments.  There are an estimated 330,000 customers of moneylenders in Ireland, the 
majority of whom are female, in the lower socio-economic group and between 35 and 54 
years of age. Almost 50% of the customers of moneylending organisations are customers of 
catalogue companies. Catalogue companies typically have lower APR then home credit 
companies with rates in the region of 43% - 72%. 
Customers report satisfaction with the convenience and ease with which they can borrow 
from and repay moneylenders. However, there is reported dissatisfaction with the interest 
rate charged. Other concerns surround the assessment of credit-worthiness, practice with 
regard to top-up loans, and repeat borrowing.   
It should be noted that the Central Bank of Ireland (Central Bank) has not granted a licence to 
any “payday” type lender, who typically charge APRs in the thousands and for whom some of 
the price caps/IRRs in other juristrictions have been specifically introduced (e.g. UK). 
Interest rate restrictions 
Globally, interest rate restrictions have become more prevalent in both developed and 
developing countries in recent years. In Europe, there has been a clear trend towards the use 
of interest rate restrictions as a policy tool to control high-cost credit. Today, 21 of the EU 28 
member states now have some form of interest rate cap on credit. These include the 3 largest 
economies in the EU (post Brexit) – Germany, France and Italy. In some cases, this is directed 
at bank lending, such as instalment loans, overdrafts or credit cards. In other cases, it is 
directed at non-bank lending such as payday/SMS loans or home credit. The latter accounts 
for much of the recent increase in IRR as a policy tool in EU member states. Other catalysts 
have been the transposition of the EU Consumer Credit Directive into national law, as well as 
public and parliamentary concerns about the detrimental impacts of specific products on 
consumer welfare. Some countries have tightened their existing IRR legislation in recent years, 
either in response to the expansion of payday/SMS loans and home credit, or to curb 
attempts to circumvent existing legislation. In addition, a number of Eastern European and 
Scandinavian countries, along with the UK, have also changed their policies on interest rate 
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restrictions over the last ten years. Ireland is now in the minority of countries in Europe that 
has no formalised interest rate restriction on high-cost credit. It should be noted that the 
Department of Finance is the appropriate authority for consideration of IRR. The Central Bank 
is the competent authority for implementing the legislation that provides for lenders of this 
type, rather than the policy-making authority.   
One of the main barriers to placing an interest rate restriction on legal moneylending is the 
fear that it will drive people to use illegal moneylenders. While it must be acknowledged that 
illegal moneylenders are one possible alternative credit source, they are not the only or 
preferred alternative. Research has shown that many of those who use moneylenders in 
Ireland already use other sources of legal credit (Byrne, McCarthy & Ward, 2005). In addition, 
as evidenced by the recent impact of an interest rate and price cap on high cost credit in the 
UK, a migration to illegal providers is not an inevitable consequence of an interest rate 
restriction. Furthermore, the Personal Finance Research Centre (2013: vii) states that, in their 
survey of 1,451 customers of high-cost credit providers, “using an illegal lender was not an 
option that the vast majority of customers would consider” in light of a restriction of credit 
from legal suppliers of high cost credit”. The research work on our behalf by iff/ZEW, and 
additional evidence from countries such as Japan and Slovakia, has indicated that the often-
quoted assertion that IRR leads to an increased market in illegal lending is disputable.  
Introducing restrictions on interest rates and limiting the total cost of credit can help protect 
the public interest by ensuring that a fair and reasonable price for credit is provided for all. 
While users of moneylenders can come from all segments of society, they are more likely to 
be from lower socio-economic groups and thus least able to afford high-cost credit. A 
restriction on interest rates and the total cost of credit will force moneylending firms to re-
examine their business model. While this may result in some people no longer being able to 
access credit, there is a high probability that some of these people would not pass a rigorous 
affordability check and may already be over-indebted. Some restriction in access to credit 
might, in fact, offer some benefit in this case, particularly as there is no clear evidence to 
suggest that people will turn to illegal moneylenders where access to legal moneylenders is 
restricted. Furthermore, in the Irish case, PMC is emerging as a credible and affordable 
alternative to moneylending for social welfare recipients. In addition, those creditworthy 
customers previously served by moneylending firms should be capable of being served by the 
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Irish credit union sector. That assumption is predicated on a clear commitment from the 
credit union sector to service these customers as their needs arise but always subject to 
creditworthiness. 
The research has highlighted many downsides that arise from doorstep moneylending. In the 
UK, 52% of home credit users believed that using this form of credit had trapped them into a 
cycle of borrowing (Personal Finance Research Centre, 2013).  Repeat usage is a concern in 
terms of how much income is being spent on high-cost credit, especially given that 14% feel 
trapped by their use of moneylenders (Central Bank 2013). Many experts in European 
countries highlighted the fact that high-cost lending is particularly targeted at people on low 
incomes, leading to a spiral of increased indebtedness and an inability to maintain payments 
for essential items such as rent and utility bills. 
 
The research has highlighted the possible link between financial exclusion and the existence of 
a thriving moneylending sector. By comparison with developed EU countries, most with very 
low single digit figures, Ireland has a high level of financial exclusion measured in the EU-SILC 
survey (2008) at 16%. This provides the fertile ground for moneylending firms to operate. The 
leading moneylending firm in Ireland and the U.K. - Provident PLC - has expanded into new 
markets in the last 20 years and has focused on (mainly East European) countries where the 
percentage of people with no bank account is far greater than 14%.  
 
Germany is an example of relevance to Ireland. Most banks in Germany offer free bank 
accounts that include a free debit card and free online banking as standard. Financial 
exclusion (close to zero) is mitigated through the role of the Sparkassen banks, which serve a 
regional and social mission. The German Supreme Court has established a very strong 
presumption that interest rates that are over double the relevant market rate are contrary to 
good morals. The maximum permissible APR is twice the market rate calculated by their 
Central Bank (BaFin). It could be argued that the credit union movement is the equivalent 
sector in Ireland as it has national coverage within a “common bond” structure and has a 
social mission. The German Supreme Court view raises the question of the moral legitimacy 
and social justice of charging excessive interest rates for access to credit, which often targets 
the most vulnerable and financially excluded consumers.  Other examples in the EU include 
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Spain, where an interest rate of 24% was deemed “excessive” and Finland, where an interest 
rate of 118% was seen as “unconscionable”. 
Consumer credit plays a key role in the economy. However, it must be moderated to protect 
consumers from any imbalance of power between a credit provider and a consumer. The 
findings from this study recommend the actions below to enhance consumer protection and 
financial inclusion for Irish consumers of high-cost credit. Further work is needed to 
understand how greater financial inclusion can be embedded in policy and financial service 
provision together with building the capacity of individuals. The latter includes the need for 
longer-term financial educational initiatives, through the community, through social 
marketing campaigns and as part of MABS.  
 
Recommendations on interest rate restrictions: 
1. Government to adopt a policy that prohibits usurious rates of interest in the interests of 
fairness to the most vulnerable in Irish society by the introduction of a restriction on 
interest rates and charges.  
2. Such a policy to be conditional on the credit union movement in Ireland committing to and 
being enabled to serve the community currently serviced by the moneylending firms, 
subject always to adherence to prudent credit guidelines. 
3. In consultation with the credit union sector, the Department of Finance consider 
increasing the 1% monthly cap on interest rates for credit unions as per Section 38 (1)(a) 
of the Credit Union Act, 1997, for this type of lending to cater for the significantly greater 
costs associated with such small lending. 
4. Ensure interest rate restriction is coupled with a limit on other fees and charges and a limit 
on the total cost of credit, with the rules carefully designed to avoid circumvention 
through the introduction of other ‘innovative’ fees and charges. 
5. Consider reducing the permissible interest, fees and charges on second and subsequent 
loans taken out by consumers. 
6. Ensure that resources are provided to enforce the interest rate restrictions and price caps 
as well as existing lending practices. 
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Recommendations to supplement the above recommendations, so as to optimise the 
outcomes of policy change: 
7. Ensure moneylenders engage in responsible lending practices. 
8. Introduce other policy measures, including actions to promote financial inclusion, which 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
The purpose of this report is to present the findings of a research study on the extent and 
variety of interest rate restrictions on high-cost consumer credit used to achieve the joint 
policy goals of financial inclusion and consumer protection. The research was funded by the 
Social Finance Foundation and the Central Bank , with the Centre for Co-operative Studies in 
University College Cork commissioned to independently conduct the research1. The context 
and terms of reference of the study are contained in Appendix 1.  
The report examines the presence or absence of interest rate restrictions in other countries, 
with a particular focus on the EU, in order to consider the appropriateness of such restrictions 
for the Irish market. Section 2 outlines the methodology that was adopted in completing the 
research. Section 3 gives an overview of the moneylending industry in Ireland, with a brief 
history of its development, current legislation and regulations, the size of the market, 
customer profile and borrowing patterns, areas of concern and alternatives available to 
consumers. Section 4 gives a short overview of high-cost credit in Europe and demonstrates 
how moneylending is one of many types of high-cost credit available to consumers in the EU. 
Section 5 outlines the global situation on interest rate ceilings and the current trends of its use 
as a policy tool for consumer protection. Section 6 focuses on EU member states, considering 
countries with and without interest rate ceilings, as well as examining some recent trends and 
changes. Section 7 discusses recent approaches to interest rates in some non-EU developed 
countries, namely Japan, Australia and Canada. Section 8 assesses the impacts of an interest 
rate restriction, considering the possible social, economic and regulatory impacts of a policy 
change. Section 9 outlines the barriers to policy change and determines the policy change that 
is most appropriate to the Irish context. Section 10 details the report’s conclusions on interest 
rate restrictions, summarising the actions that are deemed most appropriate to achieving the 
joint policy goals of consumer protection and financial inclusion. 
This study raises the question of the moral legitimacy and social justice of charging excessive 
interest rates for access to credit, which often targets the most vulnerable and financially 
excluded consumers. Legal moneylenders in Ireland are currently licensed to charge up to 
                                                          
1 The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
official policy or position of the funders. 
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188.45% APR excluding collection charges and up to 287.72% APR including collection charges, 
whereas a majority of EU member states have in place interest rate restrictions far below this 
level. In fact, some member states have ruled on the excessive nature of these higher rates. 
For example, in Spain, a rate of 24% was deemed “excessive” (Herrero, 2017) and in Finland, a 
rate of 118% was seen as “unconscionable” (Vilijanen, 2017). This study considers interest 
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Section 2: Methodology 
 
In 2016, the Social Finance Foundation approached University College Cork to carry out an 
independent study of the extent and variety of interest rate restrictions in the EU, with an 
assessment as to the appropriateness of such restrictions in the Irish market. The parameters 
of the research were jointly agreed and the services of the Centre for Co-operative Studies 
were engaged to independently conduct and objectively analyse the findings from the 
research. 
The research methodology consisted of two main parts. The first part consisted of a literature 
review of existing material in order to provide an analysis and overview on the current state of 
research on interest rate restrictions and their impact on consumers. It examined relevant 
reports, journal articles, newspaper articles, websites and speeches from public, private and 
civil society sources. The second part consisted of collecting evidence and opinions from key 
stakeholders, mainly in European countries, to update the legislative position across the EU 
and establish the consequences of the introduction of interest rate regulations. To inform this 
part of the research, the German organisation Institut Für Finanzdienstleistungen was 
contracted to facilitate the collection of information in nine European countries .2 A list of all 
the stakeholders consulted as part of the study and who provided information is included in 
Appendix 2.  
 
  
                                                          
2 Institut Für Finanzdienstleistungen e.V. (iff) is an organisation that conducts research in the field of 
sustainable financial services and advice. It was one of the main authors of the 2010 report for the EU 
Commission Study on interest rate restrictions in the EU. 
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Section 3: Moneylending in Ireland 
 
3.1 A brief history: from the 19th Century to 1933 
 
Moneylenders, along with shopkeepers and pawnbrokers, were key sources of credit for low-
income households in the late 19th and early 20th century in Ireland. In 1914, George Russell 
(AE) gave a memorandum to the committee on agricultural credit in Ireland that  stated that 
when the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society began its work from 1894 on, the country was 
‘overrun by private moneylenders’ (Mc Laughlin, 2009). 
In the mid 19th century, the United Kingdom repealed usury laws that had been in place, in 
varying forms, for many centuries. Subsequent to this repeal, there was public outrage about 
the practices of moneylenders in the late 19th century. However, the Government’s 
Moneylending Committee rejected the re-introduction of price controls on moneylending in 
1898 because ‘interest rates may not be the best measure of the cost of small loans, different 
conditions are applicable to different types of loans and ceilings would be 
circumvented’.  Instead, the 1900 Moneyenders Act conferred broad powers on judges to 
hold an agreement to be unconscionable (Ramsay, 2014). 
After the formation of the Irish state, the 1900 Act was replaced by the 1933 Moneylenders 
Act in Ireland. On the issue of usury, Article 17 of the 1933 Act set out a definition of excessive 
interest as being an interest rate greater than 39%: 
“Where ...  it is found that the interest charged exceeds the rate of thirty-nine per 
cent. per annum, or the corresponding rate in respect of any other period, the Court 
shall conclusively assume for the purposes of section 1 of the Moneylenders Act, 1900, 
that the interest charged is excessive and that the transaction is harsh and 
unconscionable, but this provision shall be without prejudice to the powers of the 
Court under that section where the Court is satisfied that the interest charged, 
although not exceeding thirty-nine per cent, per annum is excessive.” 
In the UK, the position on interest rates altered in 1927, when a presumption was introduced 
that a loan was unconscionable if it exceeded 48%. However, the courts did not use this as a 
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price ceiling, allowing lenders to include other fees and charges unless there was evidence of 
advantage taking (Ramsay, 2014).  
With the introduction of the 1974 Consumer Credit Act, the UK abolished the 48% limit and 
price controls on consumer credit did not feature in the UK again until 2015. In Ireland, the 
reference to a 39% interest rate ceiling no longer featured once the 1995 Consumer Credit Act 
came into force. 
 
3.2 A changing landscape: 1950 – 1988 
 
While the 1933 Act limited the interest rate that could be charged, the legislation did not 
prohibit collection charges and the prevalence of moneylenders continued in Irish society. 
Having witnessed the daily effects of unemployment and the consequent growth in 
moneylending activities in the 1950’s, Nora Herlihy, a teacher in Dublin, became one of the 
founders of the credit union movement in Ireland, promoting an alternative system that 
would give people command over their own resources and facilitate the elimination of 
moneylenders in the community (Mc Carthy, 1996).  
Almost 30 years ago, a study on moneylending and low-income families in Ireland traced the 
experience of 99 people who were in debt to moneylenders in Ireland, interviewing people 
from Dublin (Clondalkin, Ballymun/Finglas, Darndale/Coolock/Kilbarrack, inner city), Cork, 
Waterford and Newcastle West in Limerick. The report found that borrowing from 
moneylenders was not only extensive but was also a regular pattern in respondents’ lives, 
with a minimum of two loans at a time being the norm and continuous loans being held by 
most people. IR£346 was the average debt to moneylenders for the total survey sample. 28% 
of respondents said that unlicensed moneylenders supplied their credit, with 39% of providers 
falling into the category of unidentifiable moneylender. The most common APR was between 
200 and 299%, with over a third of loans charged at this rate. When asked for the reasons why 
they used moneylenders, 43% said it was their only credit option, 28% cited accessibility/ease 
of getting money, 12% said a relative/friend suggested it, 7% said a moneylender offered 
money, 6% said it was tradition in the family and the remaining 4% gave other reasons or 
incomplete information (Daly and Walsh, 1988). 
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3.3 Current legislation and regulations 
 
In 1995, the 1933 Moneylending Act was replaced by Part VIII of the 1995 Consumer Credit 
Act 1995. This Act details the provisions relating to moneylending and sets out the 
requirements on a number of areas including: licensing requirements, instructions on the 
maintenance of records, prohibition of default charges and charges for expenses on loans, 
collection time restrictions and a ban on selling goods while collecting repayments. The Act 
also requires that the Central Bank maintains a register of moneylenders which includes up to 
date licensing information and any other particulars that may be prescribed by the Minister of 
Finance. Under the revisions to the 1995 Consumer Credit Act, a person guilty of an offence 
under the Act is liable on summary conviction to a fine of €3,000 or imprisonment for up to 12 
months or both; if liable on conviction on indictment, a person will be liable to a fine of up to 
€100,000 or imprisonment for up to five years or both. 
Article 47-1 of the 1995 Act states that a consumer or person acting on their behalf may apply 
to the Circuit Court for a declaration that the total cost of credit provided for in an agreement 
is excessive. However, unlike the 1933 Act which stipulated an interest rate greater than 39% 
as excessive, there is no declaration in the 1995 of what is deemed an acceptable limit. The 
Central Bank, which took over the licensing of moneylenders from the Officer and Director of 
Consumer Affairs (ODCA) in 2003, does not have the remit to define the term ‘excessive’ in its 
regulation of moneylenders. The maximum APR charged in respect of specific loans ranges 
from 23% to 188.45% APR, excluding collection charges, and up to 287.72% APR when 
collection charges are included. These rates have remained largely unchanged since 2013.  
The 2008 Consumer Credit Directive (2008/48/EC) introduced a number of consumer 
protection measures and aimed to increase harmonisation of consumer credit across EU 
member states. The Directive includes articles on standard information to be included in 
advertising, pre-contractual information requirements, obligations to assess creditworthiness, 
database access, information to be included in credit agreements, right of withdrawal and 
early repayment. On the obligation to assess the creditworthiness of the consumer, Member 
States are required to:  
  
INTEREST RATE RESTRICTIONS ON CREDIT FOR LOW-INCOME BORROWERS    UCC      DECEMBER 2017 19 
 
“ensure that, before the conclusion of the credit agreement, the creditor assesses the 
consumer's creditworthiness on the basis of sufficient information, where appropriate 
obtained from the consumer and, where necessary, on the basis of a consultation of 
the relevant database.”  
 
There is also a requirement that if the parties agree to change the total amount of credit after 
the conclusion of the credit agreement, the creditor updates the financial information at their 
disposal concerning the consumer and assesses the consumer's creditworthiness before any 
significant increase in the total amount of credit. The European Directive was transposed into 
Irish national law by the European Communities (Consumer Credit Agreements) Regulations 
2010. 
The Consumer Protection Code for Licensed Moneylenders came into effect in 2009. It 
includes a number of provisions to protect consumers including: provision of information to 
the consumer, preservation of the consumers’ rights, knowing the consumer requirements, 
suitability, unsolicited contact, disclosure requirements, errors, handling complaints, 
consumer records, unsolicited credit facilities, arrears and guarantees, and debt collection. As 
part of its ongoing monitoring of existing codes, the Central Bank are planning to review the 
Consumer Protection Code for Licensed Moneylenders in 2017 to determine if the existing 
protections need to be enhanced (Central Bank , 2009). 
In 2011, a fitness and probity regime for moneylenders came into effect. Prior approval by the 
Central Bank  is now required before an individual can be appointed to a Pre-Approval 
Controlled Function in a moneylending organisation. Firms must also comply with the Criminal 
Justice (Moneylaundering and Terrorist Financing) Act 2010, as amended by the Criminal 
Justice Act 2013.  
The Central Bank is in the process of establishing a Central Credit Register - a national 
mandatory database of personal and credit information. From 31 March 2018, licensed 
moneylenders will begin submitting data to the Register in respect of loan agreements of 
€500 or more. Firms who have begun to submit data may also request credit reports after this 
date. From 30 September 2018, moneylenders must have reported existing and new credit 
agreements back-dated to 31 March 2018. Moneylenders must also check credit information 
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on the Register when considering loan applications of €2,000 or more (Central Credit Register, 
2017). 
To improve transparency, all moneylending loan agreements must include the amount lent; 
date of loan; amount, number and timing of repayments; details of collection charges; rate of 
interest; total amount payable; date that the loan ends; details of how to repay early and the 
associated rebate for early repayment. A borrower must also receive a repayment book that 
records repayments and the remaining balance due. If a moneylender is planning to take legal 
action as a result of missed payments, the moneylender must give the borrower a notice in 
writing that they are planning to take legal action, at which point the borrower has 21 days 
from the receipt of the notice to pay the arrears of the instalments due. If a borrower 
consistently fails to pay instalments on time, the moneylender may ask a court to waive the 
need to give this notice. However, in practice, moneylenders rarely take legal action against a 
borrower for non-payment of loans (FLAC, 2007). 
The legislation and regulations introduced have strengthened the protection of consumers 
and the industry is now more regulated than it has ever been. The increased compliance costs 




3.4 Supervision and Authorisation 
 
Supervision of moneylending firms is carried out by the Central Bank , mainly through reviews, 
reports, themed inspections and individual inspections where compliance concerns arise. 
Since 2011, there have been two themed inspections on licensed moneylenders. An 
inspection in 2011 focused on whether consumers were being charged in accordance with 
moneylenders’ authorised APRs and costs of credit as set out in the moneylenders’ licence. It 
also examined whether firms had their licences on display and if they indicated the high-cost 
nature of loans on loan documentation issued to consumers. Overall the inspections found a 
high level of compliance with the requirements and consumers were charged in accordance 
with moneylenders’ authorised APRs and costs of credit. The 2013 inspection also focused on 
APRs and costs of credit and found that firms were broadly in compliance, though there were 
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concerns about a small number of firms. Reports by the Financial Regulator (2007) and the 
Central Bank  (2013) on the moneylending industry have also been issued. The findings from 
these reports are discussed further in Sections 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 below. 
All moneylenders must apply on an annual basis for a renewal of their licence. This involves 
completing an application form, giving details of the firm, district court areas in which they 
operate, background to the firm (principals, shareholders etc.), regulatory background 
information, compliance and product details (type of loan, amount of loan, period of loan, 
interest charge, collection charge, any other charge, total cost of loan, APR, APR including 
collection charge, weekly/monthly repayment amount, cash cost for each €100 borrowed and 
% cost per €100 borrowed). Firms are also required to disclose the financial details of their 
turnover, total expenditure, surplus/deficit of income over expenditure, bad debts written off 
and balance sheet provision for bad and doubtful debts. Firms must also provide details for 
the previous year on the number of loans advanced, the total value of the loans advanced, the 
number of consumers with amounts outstanding, the total value of amounts outstanding on 
all loans and details of any complaints received (Central Bank , 2017). 
Interest rate restrictions are just one of a number of measures that are implemented to 
protect consumers. The following table summarises the measures that are included in the 
legislation, regulations or the code for moneylenders in Ireland to ensure responsible lending.  





Requirement to register with the Central Bank Yes 
Licensing system Yes 
Fitness and 
probity 
Prior approval by the Central Bank for Pre-Approval 




Fines and/or imprisonment for breaches of legislation Yes 
Transparency Standard information to be included in advertising Yes 
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Pre-contractual information requirements Yes 
Contractual information - Information to be included in 
credit agreements 
Yes 
Right of withdrawal Yes 
Early repayment Yes 




Obligations to assess creditworthiness Yes 
Credit limited to % of net or gross income No 
Specific requirement to obtain and consider bank 
statements or other records 
No 
Requirement to carry out credit bureau checks Not yet (partially 
from 2018) 
Ban on top-up loans/rolling over Yes 
Cost of credit Cap on total cost of credit Yes 
Limit of default fees Yes (no default 
fees permitted) 





Limit on the number of unsuccessful attempts firms can 
seek payment using continuous payment authority (in use 
in UK) 
No 
Restrictions in place on advertising high-cost financial 
products  
Yes 
Table 1: Status of responsible lending policy measures applicable to moneylending in Ireland 
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3.5 The moneylending market in Ireland 
 
In 1988, there were 127 licenced moneylenders in Ireland, with the Revenue Commissioners 
acting as the licensing authority (Daly and Walsh 1988). In 2005, the figure stood at 52 
licensed moneylenders, charging an average APR of 126.29% excluding collection charges 
(Byrne, McCarthy and Ward 2005). In that same year, the number of customers was about 
300,000 and ten years ago there were 400 agents operating door-to-door throughout the 
country, issuing new loans and collecting existing loans (Central Bank , 2007).   
As of February 2017, there are 39 licensed moneylenders in Ireland, of which three are 
licensed for payment collection only. The majority of firms (31) fall into the category of home 
collection credit firms (commonly referred to as doorstep lending) which offer cash loans 
provided in the home and repaid through a weekly home collection service. The remaining 
firms consist of “remote” firms that provide cash loans but collect repayments through 
remote methods (e.g. direct debit), “retail” firms involved in the provision of goods on credit 
with repayments being made by a variety of methods (e.g., cash, direct debit) and “others” 
who either operate on the basis of running accounts (e.g., catalogue companies, insurance 
premium finance companies) or who are authorised only to collect on moneylending 
agreements previously entered into, but not to grant further credit.3  
Of the 36 firms actively offering credit, 16 are registered with business addresses in Dublin 
and 26 are licensed in all court districts, although this does not mean they operate in all court 
district areas (Central Bank , 2017). The number of customers increased to around 360,000 in 
2014 but since then has fallen to about 330,000.4 This equates to about 7% of the population 
of Ireland.  
                                                          
3 Central Bank of Ireland 
4 ibid 
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Figure 1: Number of legal moneylenders in Ireland from 2003 – 2017 (Source: Central Bank  
Moneylending Unit) 
Today, moneylending is a multi-million euro business in Ireland. Outstanding loans currently 
amount to about €153 million (down from €200 million in 2013).5 Total outstanding consumer 
loans in Ireland amounted to €11.6 billion in October 2014, which indicates that the 
moneylending sector accounted for 1.7% of the consumer credit market in that year (Central 
Bank , 2015).    
 
 
3.6 Customer profile and borrowing patterns 
 
The majority of moneylender customers in Ireland fall in the age range of 35-54, are more 
likely to be female and in the lower-socio-economic group. The most frequent term offered is 
approximately 9 months with an APR of 125%. The average loan principal offered by those 
who charge collection fees is €566. To put this sum in context, it is the equivalent of three 
times the standard weekly social welfare payment for an individual (€188 a week).6 The most 
common reasons for borrowing are primarily to purchase personal items (goods/clothes) and 
to cover the costs of family-related occasions (Central Bank , 2013). 
                                                          
5 ibid 
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Compared to personal loans with financial institutions, utility companies, credit cards and 
mortgages, the number of active debts with moneylenders reported by clients of the Money 
Advice and Budgeting Service (MABS) is relatively low (MABS, 2016). However, it is important 
to note that moneylending firms have a repayment advantage over other lenders, due to the 
fact that their business model involves calling to a customer’s home on a weekly basis. In 
some cases, this means that a customer may pay their moneylender even if they cannot then 
afford to pay their rent, as indicated by one MABS agent.7 Moneylenders are also likely to re-
negotiate their repayments with their customers. 
 
3.7 Why is moneylending so popular? 
 
In 2007, the Financial Regulator commissioned a report on the licensed moneylending 
industry, which was followed by a similar study by the Central Bank in 2013. The 2007 study, 
which involved interviews with 333 customers, asked customers why they use licensed 
moneylenders as opposed to other lenders. 30% said it was the convenience of home 
collection, 16% said family tradition/recommendation, 14% were drawn by the immediate 
availability of credit, 14% cited their existing relationship with the moneylender, 6% said 
because they had been refused credit elsewhere/had no other credit source/not aware of 
other companies, 5% said the interest was good or cheaper and 15% gave other reasons 
including privacy, customer service and preference (Financial Regulator, 2007). 
In 2013, the reasons given were ease of availability (26%), convenience of good selection 
(25%), convenience of home collection (25%), join sports club (10%), existing relationship with 
moneylender (7%), refused credit elsewhere (5%), family tradition/recommendation (7%), 
general convenience (4%) or another reason (15%) (Central Bank , 2013).  
Daly and Walsh (1988) asked a similar question in their study almost 30 years ago. Whereas 
their report is heavily influenced by peoples’ experience of illegal moneylenders (and different 
methodologies and questionnaires were used compared to both the 2007 and 2013 surveys), 
it is worth noting that while in 1988 the main reason people gave for using moneylenders was 
because it was their only credit option (43%), it is now the ease and convenience factor that is 
given as the main reason for using licensed moneylenders.  
                                                          
7 Interview with MABS Officer in Galway on 1 March 2017 
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According to a Central Bank  report, customers’ satisfaction with legal moneylenders is high, 
with an average customer satisfaction rating of 83%. While some customers feel under 
pressure to make repayments on time (if they miss a repayment), the majority of customers 
feel that they are treated fairly and most are comfortable to engage with the moneylender to 
manage arrears. It is also worth noting that 84% of customers reported that they understand 
the cost of credit (Central Bank , 2013). 
The results of a study of customers of short-term, high-cost credit (home credit, pawnbroking 
and payday lending) in the UK are more telling about the rate of satisfaction. 94% of 
customers reported they were very satisfied or fairly satisfied with their home credit provider 
overall, the main reasons being the ‘customer service’ provided and the ‘convenience’ 
offered. However, of these 94%, only 6% stated they were satisfied with the ‘cost of 
borrowing/APR’ and 1% were satisfied that the service ‘did exactly what it said it 
would/expected/no hidden/extra charges’. Furthermore, 52% of home credit users believed 
that using this form of credit had trapped them into a cycle of borrowing (Personal Finance 
Research Centre, 2013). 
Apart from this individual impact, there is also a wider household and community impact. 
Palmer and Conaty (2002:23) highlight that there is a ‘huge transfer of resources and potential 
assets from poor communities to the directors and shareholders of loan companies’. They cite 
research in the US which found that low-income house owners are stripped of approximately 
$9.1 billion a year through the practices of the ‘alternative credit sector’. They cite research in 
the UK, carried out by ACE Credit Union Services, which found that in three streets with a total 
of 40 households, Stg£240,000 was being paid each year to high-cost lenders. The same 




3.8 Areas of concern 
 
From a consumer protection perspective, the main areas of concern appear to be the high-
cost of credit, creditworthiness assessments, top-up loans and repeat borrowing.  
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Cost of credit: the most common reason for dissatisfaction with moneylenders was the high 
interest rates charged/cost of credit (Central Bank , 2013).  
Creditworthiness assessments: in 2013, it was reported that 50% of customers did not recall 
whether their moneylender assessed their creditworthiness before their most recent loan. 
After a series of inspections on nine selected moneylenders in 2013, the Central Bank noted 
creditworthiness assessments as one area requiring greater attention by moneylenders. In a 
letter to moneylending organisations, the Central Bank stated that a firm must consider all 
existing loans and any arrears a consumer may have when assessing creditworthiness. It also 
stated that where a consumer is in arrears, the firm must give additional consideration to 
creditworthiness and should have strong evidence of a consumer’s ability to repay before 
advancing a new loan (Central Bank, 2013). The importance of creditworthiness assessments 
is highlighted in the 2013 survey, which found that more than one in five customers were 
reported to have loan agreements with more than one moneylender and a quarter of 
customers reported difficulties meeting repayments to their moneylender, creditworthiness 
assessments (Central Bank , 2013). 
Top-up loans: a borrower can have two active loans with a moneylender at the same time 
(FLAC, 2007). However, under Section 99 of the Consumer Credit Act 1995, loans or other 
credit must be advanced in full.In 2013, it was found that almost a quarter of customers were 
offered additional credit before the balance of their previous loan had been fully repaid. 
Again, this issue was highlighted by the Central Bank after its inspection of moneylenders in 
2013 (Central Bank , 2013). 
The issue received media attention in June 2015 when the Financial Services Ombudsman 
Bureau (Ombudsman) found that two borrowers in Donegal had been sold a number of top-
up loans by a licensed moneylender. The Ombudsman found that sums had been deducted 
from new loans to repay earlier loans. Although the Act does not say that such loans are 
unenforceable and that the amounts borrowed must be written off, the Financial Services 
Ombudsman directed in its decision that the outstanding amounts that remained to be paid 
on the loans in question must be written off. It also awarded each of the complainants a 
further sum of €450 each in compensation (FLAC, 2015). The issue of top-up loans has 
persisted for decades. In 1988, 40% of alterations from original loan agreements were due to 
loans being topped up (Daly and Walsh, 1988). 
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Repeat borrowing: repeat borrowing by moneylending customers is strong, with 38% having a 
relationship with their moneylender for five years or more, and 47% of customers having a 
relationship with their moneylender for one to five years. Repeat usage is a concern in terms 
of how much income is being spent on high-cost credit, especially given that 14% feel trapped 
by their use of moneylenders (Central Bank , 2013). 
There are areas of overlap between the issues faced by the Irish consumer and those 
expressed by high-cost short term credit users in the UK. A 2013 study of customers using 
short-term credit (home credit, pawnbroking and payday lending) found that the main issues 
associated with short-term credit were the cost of credit, affordability assessments, financial 
difficulty (for people using pawnbrokers and payday lenders), multiple and repeat borrowing 
from short-term lenders, and loan renewal (University of Bristol, 2013).   
Case study: Provident Personal Credit Ltd.  
Provident Personal Credit Ltd. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Provident Financial plc (a FTSE 
100 company) which, together with its subsidiaries, forms Provident Financial Group. It is 
reported to be the largest home credit moneylending firm in Ireland.  The annual report for 
Provident Personal Credit Ltd. includes both its UK and Ireland activities. In 2015, profits after 
tax came to £61.8m. Figures for Ireland alone are not available. However, the overseas tax 
charge (the company is incorporated and domiciled in the UK) for 2015 was £0.7m. Based on a 
simplistic calculation on the assumption of a corporation tax rate of 12.5%, this suggests a 
taxable profit for the year in the region of £5.6m from its business in Ireland (Provident 


















of this loan 
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Ireland €100 26 weeks 
  
187.2% 0 €30 €30 
UK £100 535.3% 0 £56 £56 
Ireland €100 52 weeks 
  
157.3% 0 €56 €56 
UK £100 299.3% 0 £87.20 £87.20 
Table 4: Provident Personal Credit’s APRs and costs of credit in Ireland and the UK (Source: 
Provident Ireland and Provident UK websites) 
The total value of Provident Personal Credit’s loan book at year end was £550.1m and the 
currency profile of amounts receivable from customers in Euro was £55.1 million. This 
suggests that about 10% of the revenue in 2015 came from its activities in Ireland. Based on 
the company’s average loan size of £500, it can be surmised that there was approximately 
110,000 loans made in Ireland in 2015. The company had 895,000 customers in both the UK 
and Ireland in 2015, down from 1,050,000 in 2014. The average period to maturity of the 
amounts receivable from customers was 6.3 months. The average effective interest rate for 
2015 was 114%. The ratio of impairment to revenue was 20.7% and the revenue yield was 
103.1%. The risk-adjusted margin (calculated as revenue less impairment as a percentage of 
average receivables) was 81.7%. Over the last three years, the company has gone through a 
business restructuring which has involved staff redundancies and the ongoing deployment of 







Research by Byrne et al (2005) showed that 65% of those borrowing from a moneylender also 
borrow from mainstream sources. 70% of those using moneylenders also borrow from 
mainstream sources, including 55% who borrow from credit unions. 
It is reported by the Central Bank  (2013) that the majority of customers do not consider 
alternative financial service providers before securing their moneylender loan. Almost a third 
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have borrowings from another credit provider, typically a bank/building society or credit 
union. While 23% of customers reported being refused a credit union or bank loan, the 
majority believe they have the ability to access credit elsewhere. When asked where they 
would borrow if their current moneylender ceased operating, the majority of respondents 
said they would either source funding from other legal sources or would no longer require 
credit. 24% would seek funds from another moneylender or do not know where they would 
source credit. 
 
Figure 2: Response from borrowers when asked what alternatives they would use if their 
current moneylender ceased operating (Source: Central Bank  Report on the Licensed 
Moneylending Industry 2013) 
 
This suggests that more than 75% of moneylending customers believe they have an 
alternative to moneylenders or would no longer require credit if their moneylender ceased 
operating.  
Credit unions in Ireland (and elsewhere) were set up to give people access to affordable 
credit. Credit unions can charge a maximum of 1% per month (12.67% APR) on the reducing 
balance of a loan to a member. Many are active in encouraging their members to consider the 
credit union as a much more affordable alternative to moneylending. Most notably, Tralee 
Credit Union Ltd. established an initiative, which they termed as ‘Keeping the Wolves from the 
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Door’ to provide information to members of the local community on the cost of a credit union 
loan as compared to a typical moneylending loan. This initiative was rolled out to some other 
credit unions, facilitated by the Irish League of Credit Unions and was particularly promoted at 
Christmas time. 
More recently, a targeted lending initiative has been rolled out. In November 2015, Personal 
Micro Credit (PMC) pilot initiative was launched in 30 credit unions across the country.  
Branded the ‘It Makes Sense Loan’, its aim is to prove that credit unions can offer a loan 
product that matches the convenience and ease that moneylenders offer and addresses the 
rates of interest charged by them while remaining within prudential lending guidelines. 
Specific objectives of the initiative are: 
o To facilitate financial inclusion and to offer an alternative to moneylenders 
o To encourage education amongst the target member segment and to move sectors of 
the community from financial exclusion to financial inclusion and sound money 
management 
o To create a useable credit history for members to ultimately enable them to access 
normal financial services and products 
o To create a path to becoming a mainstream credit union member through 
relationship building.   
 
The “It makes sense” loan is offered by participating credit unions across Ireland, providing 
loan amounts of between €100 and €2,000 for a maximum loan period of two years. Loans 
can be granted within a maximum of 24 business hours from making the application. Potential 
borrowers must be able to demonstrate a capacity to repay (It Makes Sense Loan, 2016).  
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Table 2: Comparison of costs: sample moneylender v.  “It makes sense” credit union loan 
 
The solution involves many stakeholders who have come together under a common mission 
to deliver an offering that avoids individuals having to resort to moneylenders charging 
interest rates of in excess of 180%.  These stakeholders include individual participating credit 
unions, the Department of Social Protection, the Citizens Information Board, the Social 
Finance Foundation, the Irish League of Credit Unions, the Central Bank , An Post, the 
Department of Finance, MABS, St. Vincent de Paul, the Credit Union Managers’ Association 
and the Credit Union Development Association. 
The Government endorsed the scheme in its Program for Government 2016 stating that, “We 
specifically support the rollout and extension of the Personal Microcredit (PMC) Scheme, which 
is providing simple microloans to members and helping to combat the use of moneylenders.” 
For social welfare recipients, the PMC solution is uniquely placed to assist in tackling the ease 
and convenience of moneylenders by enabling them to make a loan deduction prior to 
receiving their payments.  
An external evaluation of the PMC pilot by Amarach Research found that 52% of pilot PMC 
borrowers had previously used moneylenders, while 22% had considered going to a 
moneylender before taking out this loan.  More than 90% of borrowers rated the overall 
credit union service as good or very good and would like to borrow from a credit union again.  
The scheme received an “off the scale” Net Promoter Score of 82% (this represents the 
propensity to recommend to family and friends). 47% stated that the loan scheme has had an 
impact on how they manage money. Most importantly and most impressively, all focus group 
participants scored their experience as a nine out of ten (or greater) in terms of the positive 
impact on their lives. 
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Following the successful pilot, the initiative is being rolled out across the country. As at May 
2017, there are 105 live credit unions representing 225 sites around the country. It is 
anticipated that most credit unions will sign up to the scheme over the coming 12-18 months. 
When this position is reached, it could be said that a sustainable and credible alternative to 
the licensed moneylending firms clearly exists in Ireland.   
Although they share some of the same customers, credit unions and moneylending firms 
differ significantly in terms of their business models, typical loans and key performance 
indicators. 
 






Branch (311 branches in 
Rep. of Ireland)* 
Door-to-door  
Online 
Source of funds Members’ savings Parent company loan 
Focus of 
regulation 
Prudential – security of 
funds 
Consumer protection 
Trends Mergers Restructuring - staff 
redundancies & 
technology deployment 











Approx. 9.5% 112% 
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Arrears 9.69%* 38% 




Table 3: comparison of credit unions and moneylender Provident Personal Credit (Source: 
Central Bank Financial Condition of Credit Unions: 2011 – 2016 (*), ILCU Head Office Dublin 
(**), Provident Personal Credit Annual Report 2015 (***) 
 
In 2016, credit unions in Ireland issued over 113,000 loans of less than €500 and more than 
284,000 loans of between €500 and €2,000 in value.8 As we’ve seen above from the case 
study of Provident, this puts credit unions in a strong position in the market segment that 
provides relatively small personal loans.  
Byrne et al (2005) suggest that, in order to develop a viable business model in this segment, 
risk-based pricing needs to be applied. A number of authors (Ellison & Davies, 2008; Jones, 
2013) have highlighted the difficulty for credit unions in meeting the needs of low-income and 
high-risk customers with the normal low rate of interest charged by credit unions and they 
advocate for risk-based pricing for such lending. Best practice indicates that unless this 
approach is taken, the service will not develop (Byrne et al (2005)).  
 
Another potential alternative credit provider in Ireland in the near future is peer-to-peer 
lending platforms. Although peer-to-peer lending is currently not regulated by the Central 
Bank, there are already a few companies providing business lending and the first personal 
(consumer) lending platform is due to launch in Ireland in 2017 (Irish Times, 2016). 
 
3.10 Cost components of credit provision 
 
The ADB (2016) deconstructs the cost of credit into four main components: the cost of funds, 
operating expenses, risk premium/loan loss provisions and profit margin/mark-up. Davel 
                                                          
8 Information received by email from ILCU Monitoring team on 10 April 2017 
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(2016) cites Schierenbeck’s analysis of a credit providers’ costs, shown graphically in Figure 3 
below. The first component is the credit funds rate or cost of funds, calculated by using the 
prevailing market rates. The second component is the operating costs, which includes inputs 
such as personnel, marketing and administration/processing costs. The third component is the 
expected loss, calculated using the expected default probability and the expected recovery 
rate. The fourth component is the unexpected loss, i.e. losses that exceed the expected loss 
and which must be covered by equity reserves. The fifth and final component is the mark-up 
or profit of the credit provider. The market rate/cost of funds, operating cost and risk pricing 
elements gives a minimum credit rate percentage. The clients’ credit rate percentage is the 
minimum credit plus the credit providers’ mark-up or profit.  
 
Figure 3: Cost components of credit provision – the theory of setting interest rate limits 
(Source: Schienrenbeck, 2003 cited by Davel, 2016) 
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3.11 Section Summary 
 
This section has examined the current position of moneylending in Ireland. There are 
currently 39 licensed moneylenders in Ireland, 31 of which are deemed to be home collection 
credit firms. Moneylending firms operate under the Consumer Protection Code for Licensed 
Moneylenders 2009 and are supervised by the Central Bank . Licensed moneylenders are 
currently permitted to charge up to 188.45% APR excluding collection charges and up to 
287.72% APR incuding collection charges. There are an estimated 330,000 moneylending 
customers in Ireland at present with outstanding loans of about €153 million, accounting for 
an estimated 1.7% of consumer credit. The average loan size is €566 over 9 months at an APR 
of 125%. Moneylending customers are said to value the convenience and speed of loan 
approval offered by moneylenders. There is evidence to suggest, however, that customers are 
much less satisfied with the cost of credit. Other concerns include the extent to which 
moneylenders conduct creditworthiness assessments, the practice relating to advancing loans 
or other credit in full, and repeat borrowing. Apart from mainstream banking, credit unions 
offer consumers a clear and affordable alternative for personal lending. The Personal Micro 
Credit (PMC) initative, first launched in 2015, enables credit unions to offer a loan product 
that matches the convenience and ease offered by moneylenders but at a much more 
affordable interest rate. By law, credit unions can charge a maximum of 1% per month on the 
reducing balance of a loan. The scheme as been endorsed in the 2016 Programme for 
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Section 4: High-cost credit in Europe 
 
4.1 Development and types of high-cost credit 
 
The level of acceptability of high-cost credit varies between EU member states, as does the 
range of high-cost credit options available. The UK and Ireland are reported to have the most 
highly developed sub-prime lending markets in the EU 15 countries (iff/ZEW, 2010). 
Figure 4: state of development of the sub-prime lending market in EU 15 countries (Source: 
iff/ZEW 2010 report using DataMonitor 2007 data; data on Luxembourg not included in 
analysis, Norway included although not an EU 15 country) 
The types of high-cost credit in use across the EU can be classified as bank credit (over-
running on accounts, overdrafts and credit cards) and non-bank credit (payday loans, SMS 
loans, pawnbroking, auto leasing/hire purchase and home credit). Payday loans are popular in 
the UK, Netherlands (Flitskrediet) and Latvia. SMS loans have become popular in Latvia, 
Finland, Estonia, Denmark and Sweden. Pawnbroking is a popular source of credit in Finland, 
Romania, the UK and the Czech Republic. In 2010, experts from the UK, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden identified 
problems with high-cost credit in the non-banking and specialist lending sectors. In addition, 
experts from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ireland, Romania, Poland and the UK 
highlighted the concern that high-cost lending is particularly targeted at people on low-
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for essential items such as rent and utility bills. Experts from Estonia and Slovakia reported 
that high-cost loans have contributed to over-indebtedness generally and not just in low-
income groups (iff/ZEW, 2010).  
 
4.2 Home credit 
 
Home credit (also known as licensed moneylending or doorstep lending) is characterised by 
small-value loans usually repaid in one year or less through weekly instalments collected by an 
agent from a customer’s home. Home credit is relatively widespread in the UK and Ireland and 
serves unbanked customers in Eastern European countries. The development of home credit 
in Eastern and Southern Europe can be summarised by examining the evolution of 
International Personal Finance’s business expansion.  
 
Table 5: IPF in Eastern and Southern Europe (Source: International Personal Finance: The Big 
Picture Presentation, October 2014) 
 
 
With the exception of Spain, IPF’s expansion into new markets in the last 20 years has focused 
on countries where the percentage of people with no bank account is greater than 14%. 
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Figure 5: Percentage of people living in household with no bank account (Source: EU-SILC 
2008) 
Home credit in the UK 
Doorstep lending is the largest high-cost credit loan market in the UK. There are 420 home 
credit businesses in the UK serving an estimated 1.3 million customers (about 2% of the 
population). Loans typically range in value from £100 to £1,000, although loans of up to 
£2,000 are offered. The FCA estimates the median loan size to be £500. Based on 2016 
customer numbers, the four largest providers of home credit in the UK are Provident (900,000 
customers), Morses Club (200,000 customers), Loans at Home (95,000 customers) and Mutual 
(40,000 customers). Last year, Citizens Advice helped an estimated 23,600 people with 
unmanageable home credit debts. A third of clients seeking debt advice had been able to take 
out multiple doorstep loans. A fifth of clients held two doorstep loans. Evidence shows that 
unmanageable home credit debts in the UK can be caused by high-pressure sales tactics, poor 
affordability checks and aggressive repayment collection practices. Half of doorstep lending 
customers are in the lowest earning fifth of adults, the majority of customers are renting and 
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Home credit customers in the UK are more likely than the population as a whole to be female, 
to be under 35, to have young families, to fall into lower socio-economic groups, to live in a 
low-income household and to live in housing rented from a local council or housing 
association. The majority have at least one other credit option, though for some, home credit 
is the only available source of credit (Competition Commission, 2006). 
In 2006, the Competition Commission in the UK found that price competition among home 
credit lenders was weak and demand was unresponsive to changes in price. The weakness of 
price competition was, in part, explained by customers’ insensitivity to price. This appeared to 
stem from customers placing greater value on other product attributes and from the 
difficulties customers had in comparing the prices of home credit loans (Competition 
Commission, 2006).  
Although it is the largest high-cost credit market in the UK, the home credit market is 
contracting. Provident has reported a 50% reduction in its number of customers over the last 
six years, from 1.9 million in 2010 to less than half that in 2016 (Citizens Advice, 2017). 
 
4.3 Section Summary 
 
The range of high-cost credit products in use across Europe varies from bank credit such as 
credit cards and bank overdrafts, to non-bank credit products such as home credit, 
payday/SMS loans and pawnbrokers. Consumer credit experts from a number of European 
countries have in the past raised concerns that high-cost lending can lead to a spiral of 
increased indebtedness, resulting in an inability to maintain payments for essential items.  
Research into the home credit sector in the UK in 2006 showed that demand for doorstep 
credit was unresponsive to changes in price, which was deemed to be a result of customers 
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Section 5: Interest rate restrictions in the EU  
 
Over the last decade, there has been a strong trend towards the use of interest rate 
restrictions as a consumer protection measure in European countries. In 2010, 14 member 
states in the EU 27 had some form of IRR and 13 member states had no IRR. Of the 14 
countries with some form of interest rate restriction on credit, nine had ‘strong’ IRR in place 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) and five 
had ‘weak’ IRR in place (Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Malta and Spain) (iff/ZEW, 2010). 
Today, 21 of the EU 28 member states now have some form of interest rate cap. Of these 21, 
18 apply the restriction to all forms of lending. In some cases, this happened in parallel with 
the transposition of the EU Consumer Credit Directive into national law. In other cases, it was 
in response to the expansion of payday/SMS loan products into new markets or due to 
parliamentary pressure. The situation across EU member states is summarised in Table 6.
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Table 6: Summary of IRR status in European countries 






% OF PEOPLE 
WITH NO BANK 
ACCOUNT**** 
AUSTRIA None  -  -  -  N/A 
BELGIUM Introduced in the 
1990s 
Consumer protection, to prevent 
excessive rates and to prevent 
excessive volatility of variable 
rates 
Pawnbrokers 18.5% APR (on personal 
instalment loans in 
2016) 
0.6% 
BULGARIA Introduced in 2014 In response to people with low-





50.5% (in 2014) 
Set at maximum of x 5 
(legal rate + 10%) 
82.9% 
CROATIA None  -  - - N/A 
CYPRUS Introduced in 2011 To penalise usury and combat 
profiteering 
- 9.42%  (April 2017) 
Average bank lending 
rate plus 5-10% 
19.8% 
CZECH Introduced in 2016 To strengthen the position of Moneylenders Cap on default fees and 14.2% 
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REPUBLIC consumers and protect their 
rights 
early repayments only 
DENMARK  None  -  SMS loans - 0% 
ESTONIA Introduced in 2009 Consumer protection, the need 
to control over-indebtedness and 
mainly to prevent SMS loan 
providers from collecting 
unreasonably high interest rates 
SMS loans Set at x 3 average cost 
of consumer loan 
3.2%  
FINLAND Introduced in 2013 To reduce debt related problems 
in households and make credit 
available on more reasonable 
terms 
SMS loans  50% (April 2017) 
Set at bank reference 
rate + 50% 
0% 
FRANCE Introduced in 1935, 
changed in 1966 
and in the 1990s 
1935 cap modernised in 1966 to 
prevent abusive practices due to 
the market power of banks; to 
prevent the development of 
predatory lending to households; 
to balance the relations between 
borrower and lender 
- 20.27%  (for loans of up 
to €3,000 in Q1 2017) 
Set at  x 1.33 average 
rate 
0.3% 
GERMANY Introduced in 19th 
Century, removed in 
1940 – 1969 period, 
A Supreme court ruling in 1981, 
which started with a media 
report in 1976 that revealed 
Payday  loans, 
pawnbrokers  
Set at x 2 average rate 
or 12% above average 
0.4% 
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reintroduced in 
1970 – 1989 period, 
changed in 2000 – 
2004 period 
some specialist instalment banks 
were selling instalment credit at 
(old) high prices 
rate (APR) 
GREECE Introduced in 1996 To limit the adverse impact of 
the liberalisation of the financial 
market, restrictions on default 
interest rates were introduced 
- Absolute rate of 6.75% 
per annum on non-bank 
credit 
70.1% 
HUNGARY Introduced in 2011  Moneylenders 39.9% (Apr 2017) 
Set at the base rate 
plus 39%   
19.9% 
IRELAND Introduced for 
credit unions in 
1966, introduced for 
moneylending firms 
for the period 1933 
– 1995 only 
For credit unions: for the mutual 
benefit of members at a fair and 
reasonable rate of interest; for 
moneylenders: to avoid excessive 
interest being charged 
Moneylenders, 
pawnbrokers 




ITALY Introduced in the 
1990 – 1939 period, 
changed in the 
To prohibit credit where 
providers can apply excessive 
interest rates to people with 
- Set at x 0.5 the 
average credit market 
price 
19.1% 
                                                          
9 The Irish credit union interest rate limit of 1% per month was inherited from the US model, which in 1913 legislated for 1% interest per month “in an effort to quantify a 
‘reasonable rate of interest” (MacPherson, 1999:17). 
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1990s and the 2000 
– 2004 period 
poor credit histories and thus to 
counter usury 
LATVIA None  -  SMS/payday 
loans 
- 14.2% 
LITHUANIA Introduced in 2016  Moneylenders, 
SMS/payday 
loans 
75% + 0.04% total 
credit amount; 100% 
max cost of credit 
17.7% 
LUXEMBOURG None  -  - - 0.2% 
MALTA Introduced in the 
19th Century, 
changed in 1970 – 
1989 period 
The maximum rate of interest 
has always been fixed by the Civil 
Code (1868) 
- 8% 3.9% 
NETHERLANDS Introduced in 1900 
– 1939 period, 
changed in 2006 
To control illegal financial 
activities, protect consumers and 




Legal interest rate + 
12%  




originally in 1900 – 
1939 period, 
changed in 2009 
To protect borrowers from 




Set at x 4 the Lombard 
rate (4 x 2.5% in Feb 
2017) plus 25% loan 
value plus additional 
16.1% 
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and 2015 cap of 30% per 
annum; maximum 
total cost of credit 
100% loan value 
PORTUGAL Introduced in 1970 
– 1989 period, 
removed in 1990s 
and reintroduced in 
2009 
Consumer protection for ethical 
reasons and for protection of the 
weakest party 
Pawnbrokers Set at  x 1.25 market 
average for loan type 
or  x 1.5 market 
average of all 
consumer loan types 
4.6% 
ROMANIA None  - Moneylenders - 75.5% 
SLOVAKIA Introduced in 2005 
– 2010 period, 
changed in 2015 
Excessively high interest rates on 
consumer credit, which led to 
problems with repayment 
Moneylenders Set at x 2 average 
bank rate 
(27% in 2015) 
14% 
SLOVENIA Introduced in 1970 
– 1989 period, 
changed in 1990s 
Introduced because of usurious 
practices by non-bank providers; 
adoption of the Euro also seen as 
a reason for revising IRR 
- Set at x 2 average 
APR; varies based on 
credit term and 
amount from 13.2% - 
453% 
4.5% 
SPAIN Introduced in 1990s Consumer protection; abuses of 
financial institutions in a 
liberalised market, 
Moneylenders Overdraft, default 
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ineffectiveness of supervisory 
bodies, violation of consumer 
rights 




UK Introduced in 2015  Introduced to deal with the 




SMS loans, log 
book loans 
0.8% per day; 100% 
max total cost of 




*IRR status excludes countries with restrictions on default interest rate only (Austria, Denmark, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania and Sweden all have default 
interest rate restrictions, that is, interest paid on default loans). 
**Table excludes high-cost bank credit such as overdrafts and credit cards (financial products which are available in most countries) and sub-prime credit 
cards (growing popular in the UK); also excludes hire purchase/auto leasing/point of sale.  
***The interest rates presented are not intended for comparative purposes. Other costs such as fees and charges may not be included in the interest rate 
ceiling figures. Other non-interest costs of consumer credit such as default fees, insurance (PPI) fees, guarantee costs, collection charges, speed transfer 
costs, costs of reminders and direct debit fees can add significantly to the total cost of credit. Furthermore, it should be noted that direct comparisons 
between countries may be problematic because additional factors may be at play. 
**** Data from EU-SILC 2008 study: Percentage of people living in household with no bank account. 
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5.1 EU countries with IRR 
 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia have 
had ‘strong’ interest rate restrictions in place for several decades (iff/ZEW 2010). 
Belgium 
In Belgium, usury is regulated in the civil code and the criminal code.  There are specific rules 
on usury in the Belgian consumer credit regulation, which states that interest is not payable 
by the consumer if the APR exceeds the legally determined APR. The maximum APR is 
calculated based on the reference rate and is analysed every three months. It varies according 
to the amount and type of credit (iff/ZEW, 2010). In 2016, the maximum rate for all credit 
agreements up to €1,250 was 18.5%. This cannot be circumvented through the introduction of 
guarantees or insurance charges or fees. Short term credits of up to two months with a 
maximum cost of €4.17 per month are excluded from the consumer credit rules. There is 
some evidence that illegal credit is sometimes offered on social network sites (Service 
Public Fédéral, 2017, Swinnen, 2017, Bovy, 2017). 
France 
In France, Article L.314-6 of the Consumer Code provides that a usury loan is any conventional 
loan granted at an aggregate effective rate exceeding more than one-third the actual average 
rate of interest during the previous quarter (Legifrance, 2017). The average rate of interest in 
the previous quarter is calculated by the Banque de France every three months and varies 
depending on the credit type and amount. In the first quarter of 2017, the permissable 
interest rate was 20.27% for loans up to €3,000 (EMN, 2016). 
Germany  
Interest rate restrictions in Germany are implemented indirectly through jurisprudence rather 
than explicit caps set by the regulatory authority.  
In Germany, the Supreme Court has established a very strong presumption that interest rates 
that are double the relevant market rate are contrary to good morals. The maximum 
permissable APR is twice the market rate calculated by the Central Bank (BaFin). A further 
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ceiling of a maximum of 12 percentage points over average rates is also imposed (Clerc-
Renaud, 2017). 
Credit offered by banks dominates the credit market in Germany. There are thousands of 
banks in Germany, which can be grouped into private banks (e.g. Deutsche Bank), co-
operative banks (Volksbanken / Raiffeisenbanken), public access banks (Sparkassen) and 
foreign banks. Financial exclusion is mitigated through the role of the Sparkassen banks which 
serve a regional and social mission. Most banks in Germany offer free bank accounts which 
include a free debit card and free online banking as standard. Overall, consumer lending is not 
as prevalent in Germany as in other EU countries, with only a quarter of households using 
instalment credit. Overdrafts are an important source of credit, with about a third of 
households using overdraft credit facilities. Issues with consumer credit in the banking sector 
in Germany include rolling over of loans and using payment protection insurance as an 
additional charge on credit. In addition, overdraft rates are quite high for all banks (Clerc-
Renaud, 2017). 
Some non-bank high-cost credit providers have entered the market in the last few years. In 
2015, there were nine payday loan providers registered in Germany. They compete with (and 
offer comparable rates to) overdraft charges. A common additional charge is an express fee 
for same day credit delivery. Vexcash was the first payday loan provider to enter the market in 
2012. With more than 330,000 customers, they provide loans of between €100 and €5,000 at 
an effective annual interest rate of 13.9%. Borrowers must have a German bank account and a 
fixed monthly income of at least €500. In addition, there is a requirement that borrowers 
must not be over-indebted.  A €500 loan for 30 days will cost €5.79 or €44.79 if the funds are 
required within 24 hours (Kreditrechner, 2016, Vexcash, 2017).  
Italy 
Similar to France and Germany, Italy also sets an interest rate cap as a coefficient of the 
average credit market price. The average market price is calculated for different credit types 
and amounts, with lenders then limited to charging no more than 50% over the average 
market price. Other countries which use a coefficient of average credit market price to set the 
interest rate cap are Portugal (1.33 times the market average), Slovakia (2 times the market 
  
INTEREST RATE RESTRICTIONS ON CREDIT FOR LOW-INCOME BORROWERS    UCC      DECEMBER 2017 50 
 
average), Slovenia (2 times the market average) and Estonia (3 times the market average) 
(iff/ZEW, 2010). 
The Netherlands, Portugal, Poland and Slovakia have all made further changes to their interest 
rate restrictions over the last decade. These are discussed in the following section.  
 
5.2 EU countries with recent changes in IRR  
 
UK 
In 2010, the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) issued a report on high-cost credit in the UK. It 
noted that high-cost credit is demanded by people on lower-than-average levels of income 
and people with a poor credit history. It also noted that the high-cost credit market had low 
levels of competition but it did not consider price controls such as IRR as an appropriate policy 
measure. However, interest rate caps have since been introduced in the UK, as set out below.  
When the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) took over the regulation of consumer credit from 
the OFT in April 2014, it focused on products that posed the highest risks to consumer 
protection. At that time, there was considerable pressure from the UK Parliament to tackle 
the problem of payday loans. The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 gave the FCA a 
duty to introduce a price cap on high-cost short term credit, to secure an appropriate degree 
of protection from excessive charges (CFA, 2016). The CEO of the FCA, Martin Wheatley, made 
the position of the organisation clear in October 2013 when he said: 
“Today I’m putting payday lenders on notice: tougher regulation is coming and I expect 
them all to make changes so that consumers get a fair outcome” (FCA, 2013). 
In April 2014, a number of regulatory measures to protect consumers were introduced for 
payday loan providers. These included rules on affordability checks, limiting the number of 
times a loan can be rolled over to two, putting risk warnings on loan adverts and limiting to 
two the number of unsuccessful attempts firms can seek payment using a continuous 
payment authority (recurring payments from a customer’s bank account). 
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In January 2015, the FCA’s cap on high-cost short term loans (payday loans only, home credit 
was not included in the definition) came into effect. The cap consisted of three elements: an 
initial cost cap of 0.8% per day inclusive of interest and fees, a total cost cap of no more than 
100% the amount borrowed, and a cap of £15 on default fees. The 0.8% per day cap served to 
protect all borrowers, the 100% total cost of credit cap served to mitigate debt spirals and the 
£15 cap on default fees protected borrowers who pay back their loans late (FCA, 2014, CFA, 
2016)10. 
The impact of the price cap and the other regulatory measures on the payday loans sector has 
been significant, as evidenced in the following infographic from the FCA website. 
                                                          
10 According to the Central Bank, “while there is no comprehansive legislative cap in place in the RoI, the 
maximum cost of credit permitted is 75%. This cost of credit relates to a five year personal loan offered by one 
licensed moneylender and is subject to review as part of the annual licence application process.” 
(Correspondence with the authors, 2017) 
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Figure 6: the impact of consumer credit regulation in the UK (Source: FCA website 2016) 
According to Citizens Advice - which provides free, confidential and independent advice to 
people in England and Wales - the cap on payday loans in the UK has been a success. Before 
the cap was introduced, Citizens Advice was dealing with around 9,000 issues a quarter 
related to payday loans. By late 2016, this had dropped to about 4,000 issues a quarter, with a 
dramatic fall taking place over the first year of the price cap’s introduction. 
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Figure 7: changes in the number of Citizens Advice clients with payday loan debt issues 
before and after the introduction of regulations (Source: Citizens Advice 2017) 
 
The Consumer Finance Association (CFA, the principal trade association representing the 
interests of some of the best-known short-term lending businesses in the UK) acknowledges 
that the price cap has delivered benefits to consumers in terms of a lower cost of credit. The 
cost of credit has come down by around a third, default rates have approximately halved and 
the average amount paid in additional fees has halved since 2013. In addition, the other 
regulatory changes that were introduced have had a notable impact: the loan acceptance rate 
fell from 50% to 30%, and the number of rollovers and extensions of loans has fallen from 6 in 
2013 to 4 in 2016. Firms’ profitability has also fallen in terms of gross profits per loan, per 
customer and per amount funded, which has forced lenders to either leave the market or 
alter their business models (CFA, 2016). 
While the CFA acknowledges the benefits the changes have brought for customers, it also 
argues that the regulations and price caps have resulted in reduced access to credit, with 
certain groups of customers – excluded due to their risk profile - no longer having access to 
credit, although the actual level of exclusion is difficult to quantify (CFA, 2016).  
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There was a concern that tighter regulation of payday lending would lead to knock on 
problems elsewhere. A key question is what alternatives, if any, were used by the 800,000 
fewer people who took out a payday loan over an 18 month period. Alternative credit sources 
in the UK include sub-prime credit cards, logbook loans, guarantor loans, home credit, bank 
overdrafts, instalment loans, pawnbrokers, borrowing from family and friends, or illegal 
lenders. In a 2015 survey carried out for the CFA, when asked what they would do in the 
hypothetical situation of being unable to access a payday loan, more than a third of people 
say they would borrow from friends or family and over a quarter said they would go without 
daily essentials. 6% said they would resort to borrowing from an illegal moneylender.  
 
Figure 8: Percentage of consumers citing potential alternatives had a high-cost short term 
loan not been available (Source: CFA YouGov 2015 survey) 
Citizens Advice says that the payday loan regulations has not led to a surge of problems in 
home credit or the hire purchase market. Of the 8% of former payday loan users who now 
cannot access such a loan, most have access to other forms of credit. Citizens Advice also 
states that the total cost cap has not led to more people going to illegal moneylenders. 
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Analysis of the debts held by Citizens Advice clients shows the number of loan shark debts has 
remained constant since the introduction of the cap (Citizens Advice, 2017). 
In 2015, the FCA had committed to review the payday loan price cap in the first half of 2017 
and this review is now underway, with a report due for publication later in 2017. The FCA 
have expanded this study to look at high-cost credit products as a whole, to enable them to 
consider whether policy interventions should be extended to other products. This means that 
home-collected credit will be included within the scope of the study (FCA, 2017).  
Citzens Advice believes the limits on the cost of credit should be extended to other sectors in 
the UK including the home credit market, which provides loans to at least 1.3 million people in 
the UK. It estimates that last year it helped 23,000 people with unmanageable “doorstep 
debts”, with a third of borrowers taking out more than one loan (Citizens Advice, 2017). 
As in all countries, it is difficult to get precise figures on the scale of illegal moneylending in 
the UK. In 2010, it was estimated that the illegal lending market in the UK was used by 
310,000 individuals, which equated to 0.5% of the population (Ellison, Dignan, Forster and 
Whyley, 2010).  
Poland 
In an email communication, the Polish Office of Protection and Competition and Consumer 
Protection confirmed that there are two caps on the cost of consumer credit in Poland. There 
is a cap on the percentage rate which is set no higher than four times the Lombard rate of the 
National Bank of Poland (in February 2017, this works out as 4 x 2.5% = 10%). This cap, 
introduced in 2005, is provided for in the Civil Code. 
The second price restriction is a cap on non-interest costs of consumer credit. This is provided 
for in the Act on Consumer Credit and covers all costs, including costs of non-obligatory 
services. This second cap was introduced in March 2016 by the Amendment to the Act on 
Consumer Credit. It limits non-interest costs of credit to a flat level of 25% of the loan value 
and an additional cap of 30% per annum. The combined total of the flat 25% and the time 
dependent 30% p.a. may not, in any event, exceed 100% of the loan value. To prevent 
circumvention of the law by credit providers, the Act on Consumer Credit states that in the 
case where a loan is rolled over within 120 days of the first withdrawal, the total amount of 
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the credit (for the purpose of calculating the cap) is the total amount of the first credit, while 
the total cost of credit is the total cost of all credits/roll-overs granted within that period. If 
two loans are issued to a consumer, these are classified as two separate loans, thus they have 
separate total amounts of credit and separate costs which must respect the cap on non-
interest costs (Polish Office of Protection and Consumer Protection, 2017). 
In 2013, the Polish Financial Supervisory Authority estimated the total scale of operations of 
personal loan companies (which includes home credit companies, lending companies with 
branches/outlets and online lending companies) in Poland was in the region of PLN 3bn - PLN 
4bn (approx. €696m - €928m). Unlike banks and credit unions, home credit providers in 
Poland are not covered by the regulations and prudential supervision of the Polish Financial 
Supervision Authority. However, they must adhere to the Act on Consumer Credit (PwC, 
2013). 
Home credit providers in Poland provide loans to individuals or businesses. Loan amounts in 
2013 were reported to vary between PLN 200 – PLN 10,000 (approx. €46 - €2,300), with loans 
of higher amounts made available to regular customers. Loan terms are between 18 and 62 
weeks. Customers can make repayments through a bank account or through home collection 
by an agent. Revenues are generated through loan interest, loan commission, insurance, 
repayment commission and other contractual costs. In the event of delays in repayments, 
additional sources of income are generated from charges such as penalty interest, costs of 
reminders (phone calls, letters, personal visits) and other contractual penalties. Home 
collection payments are described as an optional form of repayment and therefore incur 
additional collection charges, which can amount to 42% of the loan amount or 56% of the 
total costs of the loan (PwC, 2013). 
Data provided by members of the consumer credit association, KPF, shows that both the value 
and number of loans provided by KPF members increased steadily from 2009 to 2013. The 
number of loans increased from just under 1 million in 2009 to over 1.2 million in 2013, with 
the value of loans over the same period growing from an average of PLN 1,500 (approx. €350) 
in 2009 to more than PLN 2,000 (approx. €460) in 2013 (PwC, 2013). 
While most households borrowed to pay for home repairs regardless of the source of funds 
(whether personal loan companies, banks or credit unions), 39% of households with debts to a 
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personal loan company reportedly used the loan to cover current spending needs (versus 15% 
for other institutions) and 31% of households used the loans to repay other debts (compared 
to 7% of loans from other institutions). Data also showed that households indebted to 
personal loan companies assign a larger portion of their net monthly income to repay their 
debt than the households with debts to other institutions (PwC, 2013). 
The Act on Consumer Credit places a number of obligations on credit providers. Before 
granting a loan, a credit provider should: conduct a customer credit risk assessment; explain 
the terms and conditions of the loan agreement to the consumer; inform the customer of the 
loan interest rate and the charges included in the total cost of the loan, the total loan amount, 
the APR value, and, when applicable, the total amount payable by the consumer, the 
repayment amounts and the duration of the loan agreement. Advertising used by the personal 
loan company may not suggest that no credit assessment is required and the consumer has a 
right to withdraw from a credit or loan agreement within 14 days, without having to state the 
reasons for the withdrawal (PwC, 2013). 
Ordinarily, consumer credit legislation falls within the remit of the Ministry of Finance. 
However in December 2016, the Polish Ministry of Justice published a draft bill which, 
amongst other details, proposed to further reduce the existing cap on non-interest charges on 
consumer loans that became effective in March 2016. Under the Ministry of Justice proposal, 
the flat level cap would be reduced from 25% to 10% of the loan value and the additional cap 
per annum would be reduced from 30% to 10%. The combined total of the flat 10% and the 
time dependent 10% p.a. would not be able to exceed 75% of the loan value (IPF Annual 
Report, 2016). 
The introduction of the new total cost of credit legislation in Poland was one of the main 
reasons cited for a £28.7m reduction in IPF’s profit before tax for 2016. It is likely that this is 
what led IPF to review customer profitability in late 2016, the result of which was a decision to 
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Netherlands 
In 2006, the maximum interest rate for consumer credit in the Netherlands was set at the 
legal interest plus 12%. However, for a number of years, loans with a duration of less than 
three months were not covered by this restriction. One such product was Flitskrediet (Flash 
Credit). Introduced to the Netherlands in 2007, Flitskrediet are short-term (less than three 
months) loans from which a new customer can receive credit in less than 24 hours (i.e. payday 
loans).  
In June 2011, the rules for consumer credit changed. The Act on Financial Supervision was 
amended due to the implementation of the Consumer Credit Directive. The amendment 
meant that the interest rate restriction (16% a year in 2011) now also applied to loans of less 
than three months’ duration (AFM, 2011). Some payday lenders attempted to circumvent the 
legislation by claiming that a charge for credit provided within 24 hours rather than five 
business days was outside the scope of the total cost of credit, claiming the ‘speed transfer’ 
was an ancillary service (IFLR, 2012). Other changes included rules on advertising, a 
mandatory credit check, loan-to-income norms and a requirement that all payday providers 
must have a licence to operate from the AFM. Currently, the interest rate restriction is 14% a 
year.  
Since 2014, there is also a cap on the costs a pawnbroker can charge, which was 4.5% per 
month in July 2015. People who cannot access credit may apply to municipal credit institutions 
such as the association for debt and social banking (NVVK) who provide social consumer loans, 
or to social welfare. However, some borrowers resort to borrowing online from firms that are 
based in other EU countries (Warnnar, 2017). 
From 2011 to 2014, The Dutch financial services authority AFM investigated 21 payday loan 
companies, 15 of which subsequently left the market. The AFM says its research shows the 
number of payday loans issued in the Netherlands has dropped from tens of thousands in 
2011 to about 1,500 in 2014. Today, almost all providers of small loans with interest rates 
above 100% have left the market (Dutch News, 2014, Ministry of Finance, 2017). In February 
2017, the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) announced a consultation 
for a ban on the advertising of harmful financial products, which includes payday loans (AFM, 
2017). 
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Door-to-door lending has not been in practice in the Netherlands for at least 40 years, With 
the mass introduction of banking accounts in the 1960’s and 1970’s, credit was transferred 
into bank accounts, not given in cash (Warnnar, 2017). 
Portugal 
Since January 2010, Portugal has had an interest rate cap framework in place applicable to 
consumer credit agreements. The framework was introduced in parallel with the transposition 
of the EU Consumer Credit Directive into national law. The main objective of the introduction 
of the interest rate cap was to enhance the access to a diversified array of unsecured credit 
products by the consumer, coupled with adequate consumer protection rules. Before June 
2013, interest rate caps were defined for different types of consumer credit as the average 
value of the APR of the agreements concluded in the previous quarter (calculated by Banco de 
Portugal) increased by one third. In July 2013, the framework was changed to avoid significant 
increases in the maximum APR of specific types of consumer credit, in particular, revolving 
credit. The maximum APR for each type of consumer credit agreement in each quarter was 
redefined as the average value of the APR of the agreements concluded in the previous 
quarter, plus 25%. In addition, the maximum APR for each type of consumer credit agreement 
cannot be higher than the average APR of all consumer credit agreements (irrespective of the 
type) concluded in the previous quarter, plus 50%. Banco de Portugal asserts that the interest 
rate caps framework has been globally positive, having enhanced the creditworthiness 
assessment of the consumer and enabled a better comparison among credit (FinCoNet, 2015).  
Finland 
Payday loans which can be applied for via the internet or text message (SMS loans) first 
entered the market in Finland in 2005. Since then, legislation has become progressively tighter 
on the sector. In 2013, an amendment to the Finnish Consumer Protection Act imposed an 
interest rate cap on certain types of consumer credit. The objective was to make credit 
available to consumers under more reasonable terms and to reduce the debt-related 
problems of households. It imposed an interest rate ceiling on cash credit under €2,000, 
whereby the maximum actual annual interest rate could not exceed the reference interest 
rate by more than 50%. In 2015, this equated to an interest rate ceiling of 50.5% (Hentunen, 
2015).  
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In 2012, 1.2 million payday loans were granted in Finland, which at the time had a population 
of 5.4 million people. The average loan amount was slightly more than €200 and the payback 
period was 30 days. Since the law entered into force, the number of small loans granted to 
households has declined, the average amount of money borrowed by means of small loans 
fell and the number of credit providers declined. In the first quarter of 2014, the amount of 
new small loans issued dropped by 54% compared with the previous quarter. The total value 
of small loans dropped to €6 million in the January to March period, a decrease of 71% on the 
previous year. In 2015, 470,000 payday loans were granted, with an average loan amount of 
€500 and a payback period of around 140 days (Panztar, 2017, Statistics Finland, 2014). 
The number of credit providers has decreased since the introduction of the interest rate 
restriction, with smaller companies leaving the market. Before the 2013 legislation, there was 
87 non-bank credit providers in Finland; this has now dropped to 55 companies (Panztar, 
2017). 
However, an unintended consequence of the legislation was that credit providers switched 
their product type and started granting loans greater than €2,000 with annual interest rates in 
excess of 100% or higher. Credit providers also started looking at providing new product 
types, such as a Mastercard prepaid card for which the interest rate cap regulation does not 
apply. It is also reported that some credit providers are circumventing the interest rate cap 
regulation by requiring a guarantee (which involves a fee) to access credit (Finnish Consumer 
Ombudsman, 2014).  
Attempts made to circumvent the interest rate restrictions led to the Supreme Court issuing a 
ruling in 2016 that an effective interest rate of 118% per annum was unconscionable. It 
referred to the 50% ceiling on loans below €2,000 and stated that rates exceeding the limit 
are suspect, but the ruling did not articulate a ceiling rate for the limits (Viljanen, 2017). 
An assessment of the 2013 amendments to the Consumer Protection Act (of which one of the 
most significant changes was the interest rate cap on instant loans) concludes that, while the 
amendments seem to have reduced the number of debt problems in all age groups, it has at 
the same time increased the size of the average debt per debtor. The results also suggest that 
while the tightened lending conditions have meant that young adults in particular can no 
longer obtain an instant loan as easily as before, debt problems related to instant loans may 
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have moved to older age groups (University of Helsinki, 2016). Another impact of the 
legislation has been a reduction in the number of district court decisions on default cases 
(Panztar, 2017). 
There are currently proposals to amend the legislation so that the interest rate ceiling also 
applies to credit amounts greater than €2,000. In addition, it is proposed that new legislation 
address some loopholes in relation to long-term credit. The Consumer Ombudsman is also 
investigating whether larger credit sums should be subjected to a lower interest rate, as well 
as assessing the ability of social credit to address some of the credit needs of consumers. It is 
also keen to include powers to impose penalties and sanctions to act as deterrants to 
breaches of legislation (Makkonen, 2016). 
 
Slovakia  
In January 2015, Národná Banka Slovenska (NBS, the National Bank of Slovakia) formally took 
over responsibility for consumer protection in the Slovak financial market, making 2015 the 
first year of supervision in the area of financial consumer protection. The range of supervisory 
tools and powers available to the NBS were extended through an amendment to the Financial 
Market Supervision Act (NBS Annual Report, 2016). Non-bank credit providers are obliged to 
register with the NBS and must fulfil a number of conditions in order to secure their licence. 
Before the NBS took over the register of creditors, there were 279 non-bank lenders in 
Slovakia. Currently, this now stands at 34, which includes hire purchase and auto-leasing 
companies as well as home credit providers (Národná banka Slovenska, 2017). Creditors must 
also check at least one electronic register of consumer loans data before issuing a loan in 
order to assess ability to repay. If credit providers are found to be in breach of the legislation, 
penalties include a fine of up to €140,000 or having their licence revoked. 
In 2014, an interest rate ceiling of twice the average APR was introduced for consumer credit 
from banks. In 2015, a vote in the Slovak Parliament to change consumer legislation was 
passed, legislating for a  cap of twice the average rate of bank loans (27% in 2015) on 
remuneration to all costs (mandatory and non-mandatory) associated with consumer loans. 
The 2015 interest rate cap had a dramatic impact on International Personal Finance, a 
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company that created out of Provident in 2007. In the 12 months to June 2015, its Slovak 
business had generated £43 million in revenue and pretax profit of £6 million. However, as a 
result of the cap, it closed its Slovakian business in 2016 (The Guardian, 2015, Investors 
Chronicle, 2016). 
NBS (2017) reports that subsequent to the 2015 cap, credit providers attempted to introduce 
new charges that could circumvent the legislation, which resulted in misleading consumers 
and unfair practices.  
There were concerns that the tightened restrictions would push people with low or irregular 
incomes without bank accounts to illegal moneylenders. However, a study led by the Institute 
of Savings and Investment in 2015 found that the main source to which consumers switched 
for credit was the banking sector (Šebo, 2017). While there is no specific data available on 
other alternatives, it is likely that unregulated lending such as peer-to-peer lending and 
lending from friends and family has also grown. 
Czech Republic  
In 2016, The Czech Republic signed a new Consumer Credit Act into law. This Act sets a cap on 
charges for early loan repayment and a cap on charges for non-performing loans. The new 
legislation also requires non-bank credit providers to obtain a licence from the Czech National 
Bank (CNB), with the CNB maintaining a publicly accessible register of non-bank credit 
providers (Euromonitor International, 2016). The new licensing regulations also stipulates that 
agents must have either a secondary education or at least three years’ of financial service 
experience and there must be a clear separation of duties between sales and credit 
decisioning teams. Modifications to proof of income processes were also introduced (IPF 
Annual Report, 2016). 
 
Lithuania 
In 2011, the maximum permissable APRC in Lithuania was reduced from 250% to 200% 
(Bublienė, 2013). In 2016, this was reduced further with the introduction of new legislation, 
which states that the overall cost of consumer credit is considered to be unreasonable if at 
any time the percentage rate exceeds 75% and all other fees and charges (other than interest) 
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exceed 0.04% of the total amount of the consumer credit; or the overall total cost of 
consumer credit (including all fees and charges) exceeds the overall amount of the consumer 
credit. Other consumer protection measures introduced include a limit on default interest 
charges, a requirement on lenders to inspect databases and available registers to assess 
creditworthiness and a reassessment of creditworthiness if there is a significant increase in 
the amount of credit being requested by an existing customer (Sorainen, 2015). 
Estonia 
In 2009, the Estonian Parliament passed a legislative amendment setting forth a rule that 
usurious credit contracts can be considered to be against good morals and thus void. In the 
case of consumer-credit contracts, it is assumed that an agreement is contrary to good morals 
if the APRC payable by the consumer is more than three times the average Estonian Central 
Bank rate (Sein, 2013). However, the legislation has not been effective in limiting the costs of 
consumer credit loans in Estonia.  
In 2014, the Estonian government approved a bill that set an upper limit to the credit cost of 
consumer loans. The bill was passed into law in July 2015 and was part of a package of 
legislative acts targeted at solving problems in the speed lending market. According to the 
new regulations, a contract that exceeds the triple credit cost rate of Bank of Estonia would be 
automatically null and void. Currently, the APRC is 18.95% which means that credit 
agreements with an APRC in excess of 56.85% are null and void (The Baltic Course, 2014, Sein, 
2017). 
In 2014, it was estimated that 123 firms were operating in the high-cost credit market in 
Estonia, accounting for 25% of the consumer credit market. From March 2015, all credit 
providers were required to obtain a licence in order to legally operate. In June 2016, only 39 
companies were authorised to operate as credit providers. The supervision of non-bank credit 
providers used to be the sole responsibility of the Consumer Protection Authority but since 
April 2015, the responsibility is now shared by the Consumer Protection Authority and the 
Financial Supervision Authority. The latter may impose fines of up to €32,000 or may revoke 
the license of credit providers that are found to be in breach of the legislation (Sein, 2017). 
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Cyprus 
The right to engage in moneylending is not restricted to licensed financial institutions in 
Cyprus. Therefore, any person or company can engage in moneylending.. The Moneylenders 
Law 1962 requires moneylenders to register but this legislation has never been enforced. 
Therefore, the number of moneylenders operating in the country is unknown. In 2011, new 
legislation applicable to non-financial institutions was introduced through an amendment to 
the Criminal Code. The legislation included a restriction on the interest rate calculated using a 
formula based on half the average bank lending rate of the previous year plus a margin of 
between five and 10 percentage points, depending on various risk factors. In December 2011, 
the interest rate ceiling was 12.57% and this has since dropped to 9.42%. The cap includes 
interest received or charged on granting of loans, extension of repayment, pre-payment and 
renewal (Harneys, 2011, Markou, 2017).  
Hungary 
In Hungary, high-cost consumer loans and credit card loans are capped at 39 percentage 
points over the Hungarian National Bank base rate (International Law Office, 2011). In 2015, 
loan repayments were capped at no more than 50% of a person’s income (The Telegraph, 
2015). 
Bulgaria 
Interest rate cap were introduced in Bulgaria in 2014 through its Consumer Loans Act. The 
amended law sets the ceiling on annual interest rates at 10% above the legal rate set by the 
Cabinet for overdue payments, multiplied by five. This means that in 2014, the cap was about 
50.5%, given that the Government rate for overdue payments is 0.1 % [(0.1 +10) x5]. The cap 
is targeted at non-banking lending institutions offering quick loans of about €500 usually 
repaid over one year (The Sofia Globe, 2014). 
 
5.3 EU countries considering IRR 
 
Denmark and Sweden do not have IRR in place. However, there has been discussions on the 
issue in both countries in recent years.  
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In 2009 and 2010, the debate on interest rate ceilings came to the fore in Denmark, due to the 
emergence of SMS loans, offering quick loans via mobile phones with APRs in excess of 
2,000%. A bill was proposed to introduce an interest rate cap set at the Central Bank base rate 
plus 15%. The Danish Consumer Council was in favour of introducing a restriction (iff/ZEW, 
2010). However, in March 2011, the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority said it did not 
consider direct interest rate restrictions an appropriate way to regulate the market for 
borrowing (Danish Financial Supervisory Authority, 2011).  
In 2006, SMS loans were introduced in Sweden in 2006 and proved popular with the youth 
population. Although there has been legislative changes on consumer credit in Sweden in 
recent years (Consumer Credit Act 2010 and the Certain Consumer Credit-related Operations 
Act 2014) these did not include the introduction of any interest rate caps (FI, 2016). The 
provisions that entered into force in 2014 gave the Swedish Consumer Agency powers to 
impose sanctions on firms that do not properly conduct creditworthiness assessments. Before 
the 2014 legislative changes, payday loan providers were only required to register with the 
authorities. Now, all credit providers have to be authorised by the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority. Currently, there are 42 consumer credit companies with permits to 
operate in Sweden (Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2017) 
In 2015, a public inquiry was launched in Sweden to investigate the high-cost consumer credit 
market. The report was published in 2016 and proposed that an interest rate restriction 
should be introduced for high-cost credit. The proposed restrictions were: a) maximum APR 
set at the national benchmark interest rate (currently -0.5%) plus 30%; b) the interest rate or 
the default rate not to exceed the national benchmark rate plus 40%; c) a cap on the total cost 
of credit of 100% the amount of credit. The proposals are currently being analysed by the 
Government (Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2017). Some sources expect that interest rate caps, 
total loan amount caps, and restrictions on marketing and loan extensions will be introduced 
in 2018 (Euromonitor, 2016). 
 
5.4 EU countries with no IRR 
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As well as Denmark and Sweden, other European countries that have not introduced interest 
rate ceilings are Austria, Croatia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania and Ireland.   
The payday loan industry has been growing in Spain in recent years, with loans of between 
€50 and €500 offered for 30 days. In 2016, a 30 day loan of €300 the 30 day cost between €84 
and €111, representing interest rates between 28% and 37% (AEMIP, 2016). While there are 
interest rate restrictions on overdrafts, default charges and mortgage loans in Spain, there are 
no limits set by the Regulator on high-cost credit providers, though the issue has come up in 
the courts. In 2015, there was a ruling in the Supreme Court that an interest rate of 24% was 
excessive and thus in breach of the 1908 legislation on usury, but it would seem that this is 
often exceeded in practice (Herrero, 2017). 
 
5.5 Section Summary 
 
There has been a growing trend in recent years towards the use of interest rate restrictions as 
a consumer protection tool in European countries. Today, 21 of the EU 28 member states now 
have some form of interest rate cap on credit. In some cases, this is directed at bank lending, 
such as instalment loans, overdrafts or credit cards. In other cases, it is directed at non-bank 
lending such as payday/SMS loans or home credit. The latter accounts for much of the recent 
increase in IRR as a policy tool in EU member states. Other catalysts have been the 
transposition of the EU Consumer Credit Directive into national law, as well as public and 
parliamentary concerns about the detrimental impacts of specific products on consumer 
welfare. Countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia have had strong interest rate restrictions in place for several decades. 
Some of these countries (Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia) have tightened their legislation in 
recent years, either in response to the expansion of payday/SMS loans and home credit, or to 
curb attempts to circumvent existing legislation. A number of Eastern European and 
Scandinavian countries, along with the UK, have also changed their policies on interest rate 
restrictions over the last ten years.   
The UK introduced a number of regulatory measures in 2015 to the payday loan market, 
including a price cap consisting of interest rate %, a total cost of credit cap and a cap on 
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default fees. The cap has reduced the cost of payday loan credit by around a third. There were 
concerns that the regulations would lead to an increase in illegal lending. The trade 
association CFA’s 2015 survey showed that only 6% of people said they would resort to 
borrowing from an illegal moneylender if they were unable to access a payday loan. An 
analysis of debts held by Citizens Advice clients shows that the number of loan shark debts 
has remained constant since the introduction of the cap. Citizens Advice say the cap has not 
led to more people going to illegal moneylenders. This is similar to the findings from a study in 
Slovakia. In 2015, Slovakia passed legislation for a cap on all mandatory and non-mandatory 
costs associated with consumer loans. This led to the home credit provider IPF (a spin-off from 
Provident) exiting the market. There were concerns that the restrictions would push people 
with low or irregular incomes without bank accounts to illegal moneylenders. However, a 
2015 study found that the main source to which consumers switched for credit was the 
banking sector. The FCA is currently reviewing the entire high-cost credit market, to consider 
whether policy interventions should be extended to other products including home credit. Its 
report will be published later in 2017.   
Attempts to circumvent legislation by introducing new fees and charges or altering the 
product is a common reaction by credit providers to interest rate legislation, as evidenced in 
Poland (e.g. cost of reminders such as phone calls, letters, home visits), Netherlands and 
Germany (‘speed transfer’ fees) and Finland (providing new product types for which the cap 
does not apply). This highlights the importance of an interest rate restriction being part of a 
comprehensive cap (i.e. interest rate restriction plus a cap on the total cost of credit, or an 
interest rate restriction plus a cap on non-interest fees and charges) to avoid the need to 
introduce additional legislation.  




In 1954, Japan introduced two laws relating to interest rates. The first was a Capital 
Subscription Law which stated that any charging of interest rates in excess of 109.5% was a 
                                                          
11 A brief examination of IRR in developing countries is contained in Appendix 3. 
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criminal act with possible sanctions of imprisonment and fines. The second was the Interest 
Rate Restrictions Law (IRRL) which set an interest rate limit for moneylenders of 20% for loans 
less than 100,000 Yen (approx. €820 using today’s interest rates); 18% for loans in the range 
of 100,000 – 1,000,000 Yen (€820 - €8,200) and 15% for loans in excess of 1,000,000 Yen 
(Gibbons, 2012). 
In 1983, the Moneylending Control Law was introduced. This law led to a series of incremental 
reductions in the interest rate cap imposed by the Capital Subscription Law, from the 109.5% 
level (set in 1954) to 73% (1973), to 54.75% (1986) to 40% (1991) with a further reduction to 
29.2% (2000). However, these interest rate reductions failed to deter the moneylender boom. 
Between 1991 and 2006, the number of people in debt in Japan doubled to 14 million and the 
number of bankruptcies increased sixteen fold in the 1990 – 2005 period. It is reported that 
almost 8,000 people committed suicide for economic reasons in 2005 (Gibbons, 2012).  
In 2006, the Financial Services Agency reviewed the Moneylending Control Law and made a 
number of recommendations to curb the moneylending crisis in the country. The 
Moneylenders Law of 2006 introduced a number of measures to tighten regulation. These 
measures included an increase in the maximum sentence for loan sharking; changes to debt 
collection rules; qualification examinations for moneylending managers; increased asset 
requirements for moneylending companies; the establishment of designated credit bureaus; a 
limit on lending to one third of the borrower’s gross annual income and a further reduction in 
the interest rate cap from 29.2% to 20%. Moneylenders were also required to keep track of 
borrower income on an annual basis and seek relevant tax documentation for loans in excess 
of 500,000 Yen/€4,100 (Gibbons, 2012). 
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Figure 9: changes in interest rate cap in Japan from 1954 - 2006 
Kozuka & Nottage (2007) attribute the moneylending boom in Japan to four main factors. On 
the demand side, the economic slowdown was a significant factor. On the supply side, three 
key factors were technological advances that  made access to credit easier (including un-
staffed loan dispenser booths from 1993 onwards), expansion of advertising operations and 
the development of a high level of rollover and repeat lending. 
The Japanese Supreme Court also played an important role in the decline of moneylending in 
Japan when, in 2006, it ruled that interest rates in excess of 20% were ‘excessive’ and that 
moneylending companies were liable to repay to borrowers interest charged in excess of the 
20% stipulated in the IRRL. This resulted in litigation by borrowers organised by the Japanese 
Federation of Bar Associations (Gibbons, 2012, Financial Times, 2014). 
Between 2007 and 2011, the number of people borrowing from moneylenders reduced from 
11.7 million to approximately 8 million. The outstanding balances on consumer finance 
companies (11.7 trillion Yen in 2006) reduced to 3.6 trillion Yen by March 2011. In addition, it 
is likely that the Moneylending law contributed to the reduction in the number of 
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Table 7: Summary of the changes in the moneylending sector in Japan  
With regard to the question of where the borrowers have gone, data from the Statistics 
Bureau show no signifcant increase in the amounts lent by domestic banks or Shinkin 
(regional co-operative banks similar to credit unions) for non-mortgage lending. Gibbons 
(2012) concludes that restricting the level of borrowing from moneylenders has not led to 
increased borrowing from other sources but has shifted borrower behaviour to reducing their 
use of credit.  
An argument against imposing interest rate restrictions on legal moneylending is that in doing 
so, borrowers will switch to using illegal moneylenders. However, Gibbons (2012) argues that 
the evidence from Japan shows that illegal moneylending grew alongside the expansion of 
legal moneylending. In April 2012, the Minister for Financial Services Mr. Shozaburo Jimi 
confirmed that the official position of the Japanese government is that the 2006 
Moneylending Law (which includes an IRR of 20%) has been successful in reducing illegal 
lending (Gibbons, 2012).   
In 2014, it was reported that the Japanese Government was considering an easing of the 
consumer credit laws, with the Liberal Democratic party confirming that a working group had 











Enhancements to the Australian National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 were enacted 
by the Consumer Credit Legislation Amendment (Enhancements) Act 2012. The 2012 
enhancements included specific provisions for small amount credit contracts (SACC) and 
consumer leases. SACC loans are basically payday loans of up to Aus$2,000 (about €1,400) 
with a contract term of between 16 days and 12 months (Australian Government the 
Treasury, 2016). In 2015, a survey conducted by the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (Australia’s consumer credit regulator) found that the payday lending industry 
provided over $831 million in credit in the 2014–15 financial year with almost 1.5 million loans 
issued (ASIC 2015). The short term lending market in Australia is predicted to be worth 
AUS$2bn by 2018. In 2015, repeat borrowers made up 38% of payday loan recipients (The 
Guardian, 2017). 
Restrictions on fees and charges for SACCs included in the 2012 legislation are as follows: 
 A maximum permitted establishment fee of 20% of the adjusted credit amount 
 A maximum monthly fee of 4% of the adjusted credit amount (i.e. charged on the 
initial amount, not on a diminishing balance) 
 A maximum amount recovered of twice the adjusted credit amount for payments in 
default 
 A government fee, charge or duty payable 
In addition, enforcement expenses (the costs of the credit provider going to court to recover 
the money owed to them) can also be charged by lenders.  
The 2012 enactments also called for a review of SACCs to be undertaken as soon as 
practicable after 1 July 2015. This review was carried out and a final report issued in March 
2016. The terms of reference for the review outlined a number of specific issues to be taken 
into account: competition, fairness, innovation, efficiency, access to finance, regulatory 
compliance costs, consumer protection and appropriateness of the legislation to the current 
economic climate (Australian Government the Treasury, 2016). 
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The review came up with a number of recommendations for SACCs, several of which related 
to clarifications on fees and charges. It recommended that direct debit fees should be 
incorporated into the existing fee cap; a credit contract must have equal repayments over the 
life of the loan (to avoid consumers having to pay a higher cost through an artificial 
lengthening of the contract term); the monthly fee cannot be charged after early repayment 
of a loan; default fees charged must reflect actual costs and should not exceed $10 per week; 
and providers should not be permitted to set up arrangements with subsidiaries or third 
parties under which consumers would incur fees or charges that exceed those set out in the 
legislation. Other recommendations related to affordability, namely reducing the cap on the 
total amount of SACC repayments from 20% of a consumer’s gross income to 10% of a 
consumer’s net income. The report also recommends that the obligation for SACC providers to 
obtain and consider 90 days for bank statements be retained (Australian Government the 
Treasury, 2016). 
The report acknowledged that SACCs can be a useful source of funding in emergency 
situations whereby the benefits of having access to this credit source justifies the relatively 
high-costs, provided the consumer can afford them. However, it noted that repeat borrowing 
can put consumers on the path of financial exclusion when the repayments consume a greater 
portion of their income (Australian Government the Treasury, 2016).  
There is now pressure on the government from consumer advocates to act on the 
recommendations in the 2015 review and a spokesperson for the Minister for Revenue and 





The payday loan industry first emerged in Canada in the mid-1990s. Since then, it has grown 
rapidly. There are now almost 2 million people using payday loan providers annually and there 
are an estimated 1,400 retail outlets across the country (Canadian Consumer Finance 
Association, 2017).  
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Up until 2006, payday loans in Canada were limited by federal usury laws from charging annual 
interest in excess of 60%. In 2007, an Act to amend the Criminal Code was passed. This 
amendment to the Criminal Code (criminal interest rate) delegated responsibility to the 
provinces for protecting recipients of payday loans and limiting the total cost of credit. The 
amendment also defined a payday loan as a loan of $1,500 or less with a loan term of 62 days 
or less. Since 2007, six provinces have introduced legislation and two other provinces have 
signalled that they intend to pass legislation. Quebec limits the annual rate of interest for all 
lenders to 35% and legal payday lenders have never established themselves in the province. 
Newfoundland retained the 60% interest rate ceiling in the Federal Criminal Code (Packman, 
2014, Consumers Council of Canada, 2015). 
In 2016, the province of Ontario dropped its total cost of borrowing from $21 per $100 
borrowed to $18 per $100 borrowed. In addition, legislators in Alberta dropped the total cost 
of borrowing to $15 for every $100 borrowed for a two-week loan, making it the lowest in 
Canada and one of the lowest in the world. Similar low rates can be found in British Columbia, 
where a $17 cost cap for a $100 two-week loan is in place (Barry, 2017). 
In February 2017, a study by an Ontario insolvency firm revealed that a record one in four 
people who file for insolvency in Ontario use payday loans (Newswire, 2017). 
 
6.4 United States of America 
 
Although there are general federal laws such as the Truth in Lending Act which apply to 
consumer lending, there has been no federal law regulating interest rates on consumer loans 
in the US. Restrictions on interest rates on consumer credit is an issue for state legislatures, 
which has led to a high degree of heterogeneity in the interest rates charged on high-cost 
credit across the country. While 18 states and the District of Columbia ban or cap payday 
loans at 36% or less, in other states it is legal to charge 400% or more per annum for a loan 
(Goldsmith and Martin, 2014).  There are also special protections through the Military Lending 
Act for active duty service members and their dependents who use certain payday loans and 
other small dollar credit products (Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, 2017). In June 2016, 
the Obama administration announced plans to regulate the payday loan industry. Instead of 
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resorting to an interest rate cap, the administration was proposing a payday rule, requiring 
lenders to administer a full payment test on potential borrowers, offer a principal pay-off 
option for certain short term loans, offer less risky longer-term lending options and adhere to 
a cutoff for direct debit attempts (Wall Street Journal, 2016). 
 
6.5 Section Summary 
In 2006, Japan introduced a number of measures to deal with the moneylending crisis in the 
country, which had boomed due to economic slowdown, easier access to credit due to 
technological advances, expansion of advertising products and high levels of rollover and 
repeat leding. The Japanese Government coupled a reduction in the interest rate with a 
number of measures including an increase in the maximum sentence for loan sharking, 
changes to debt collection rules, the establishment of credit bureaus, and limiting lending to 
one third of a borrower’s gross annual income. A 2012 study of the moneylending sector 
concluded that restricting the level of borrowing from moneylenders did not lead to increased 
borrowing from other sources but instead shifted borrower behaviour to reducing their use of 
credit. However, in 2011, there were still 8 million people borrowing from moneylenders in 
Japan (down from 11.7 million in 2006/2007), indicating that there was still quite a high 
demand for this type of credit. There was also a concern that restricting legal moneylending 
would result in borrowers switching to illegal moneylenders. However, the official position of 
the Japanese Government is that the 2006 Moneylending Law has been successful in reducing 
illegal lending.  
In Australia, the short-term lending market is predicted to be worth AUS$2 billion (€1.37 
billion) by 2018. The Australian Government is strengthening the legislation around high-cost 
short-term credit (payday loans). In 2012, it introduced a number of restrictions on fees and 
charges. In 2015, it reviewed the regulations and made a number of recommendations 
including clarification on fees and charges, limiting repayments to 10% of a consumer’s net 
income and improved creditworthiness checks. Canada also has a large payday loan industry, 
with different rules in place across the different provinces. Since 2007, six provinces have 
introduced legislation and two other provinces have signalled that they intend to pass 
legislation. Alberta has a total cost of borrowing of $15 for every $100 borrowed for a two-
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week loan, making it one of the lowest in the world for payday loans. In the US, practice 
depends on state legislatures. 18 states and the District of Columbia ban or cap payday loans 
at 36% or less, while in other states it is legal to charge 400% or more per annum for a loan.  
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Section 7: Potential impacts of an interest rate restriction policy 
 
The debate around interest rate restrictions is often ideological, given that the arguments can 
be framed in terms of social or economic costs and benefits. Those in favour of interest rate 
ceilings note the role such a measure can play in protecting low-income borrowers from usury 
(consumer protection), preventing over-indebtedness, reducing the cost of credit for low-
income borrowers and addressing market failures. The World Bank (2014) summarises the 
main arguments in favour of IRR as follows: 
“Most countries regulate interest rates with the broad aim of protecting consumers, as 
in the case of Spain. Other countries provided more specific objectives, such as 
protecting the weakest parties (Portugal); shielding consumers from predatory lending 
and excessive interest rates (Belgium, France, the Kyrgyz Republic, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic, and the United Kingdom); and decreasing the risk-taking behaviour of credit 
providers (the Netherlands). Similarly, in Thailand, authorities stated that the purpose 
of the caps was to make finance more affordable for low-income borrowers. Finally, 
Zambia’s authorities introduced the cap to mitigate the perceived risk of over 
indebtedness and the high-cost of credit, as well as to enhance access to the 
underserved.” 
On the other hand, those who oppose the introduction of IRR highlight the possible 
unintended consequences that can arise from implementing such a policy: an increase in 
illegal moneylenders, an introduction of other charges to circumvent the IRR (reducing 
transparency) and a reduction in access to credit, competition and choice.  
7.1 Social impacts 
 
7.1.1 Consumer protection   
 
Moneylender customers (50% of whom relate to customers of catalogue firms) “are more 
likely to be in the lower socio-economic group” (Central Bank, 2013:5) for whom the cost of 
credit may be more of a challenge. Interest rate restrictions can ensure that the best interests 
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of all consumers are protected, making credit available at a reasonable and fair rate of 
interest. In its report on responsible lending, FinCoNet (2014, page 18) noted: 
“While it is recognised that consumers have responsibilities in the decision-making 
process when obtaining credit, regulatory intervention may be necessary to address 
the imbalance of power between a consumer and a credit provider. In some instances, 
it may be appropriate to ban or restrict certain products or product features that may 
adversely affect a consumer’s interests.” 
7.1.2 Access to credit  
 
There is strong evidence that interest rate restrictions reduce access to credit for consumers, 
particularly for low-income borrowers (University of Bristol, 2013). 
The 2010 EU study of IRR in the EU found that it was plausible that IRR reduce credit access, in 
particular for low-income borrowers. When respondents to the EU 2010 study were asked 
what the likely effects of IRR will be on low-income borrowers, the majority of respondents 
perceived that the introduction of IRR of twice the average interest rate would decrease 
credit access. This view was unanimous amongst provider associations but opinion was split 
almost 50:50 among consumer organisation respondents. When asked again about the 
introduction of IRR (this time set at a maximum of 30% APR) respondents were more 
emphatic of the negative consequences this would have on credit access for low-income 
borrowers. This suggests that most respondents (in countries where there is no IRR) consider 
a floating interest rate/relative rate ceiling as a better option from the perspective of credit 
access for low-income borrowers. Finally, respondents were asked to describe the level of 
credit options available to low-income consumers in their member state. The findings 
suggests that the majority of low-income borrowers are perceived to have limited credit 
options, regardless of whether or not member states have IRR in place (iff/ZEW, 2010). 
Other studies cited by iff/ZEW (2010) highlighting that access to credit will reduce with the 
introduction of an interest rate cap include those completed by Policis (2004), OFT (2010), 
Villegas (1982, study on automotive credit markets), Zinman (2008, study on interest rate caps 
on payday loans in the US) and IGF/IGAS (2009). IRR resulting in reduced access to credit is 
confirmed by existing literature on IRR in the US, although it should be noted that this is based 
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on a relatively low interest rate of 12%, whereas in many European countries (including 
Ireland for legal moneylending entities) the interest rate is much higher and so care should be 
taken in drawing a direct comparison. Some studies also indicate that the presence of interest 
rate restrictions means that small amounts of credit often become unavailable (iff/ZEW, 
2010). 
If the IRR is set at a level that is deemed to make the business untenable, credit providers may 
leave the market, as was the case with the home credit provider IPF in Slovakia in 2016. A 
restriction on interest rates will force credit providers to re-examine their business model, 
which could mean they are less likely to lend to high risk borrowers with a high probability of 
defaulting. In Poland, following a review of customer profitability in 2016, IPF took the 
decision to cease lending to certain higher risk segments of customers and the firm expects 
this action to reduce the level of loan impairment (IPF Annual Report, 2016). This is similar to 
the impact of a lowered interest rate cap in Ecuador, where financial exclusion increased due 
to the reduction in the provision of smaller, riskier loans to poorer clients (FSD Africa, 2013). It 
is therefore possible that the benefit of an interest rate restriction only accrues to the ‘better 
off’ borrowers, with more high-risk borrowers being eliminated by credit providers. 
One likely reaction of credit providers to an interest rate restriction is to increase the loan size 
(fewer loans but larger size) or to extend the loan duration, as a means of maintaining overall 
profits. 
However, whether or not an interest rate cap reduces access to credit largely depends on the 
level at which the cap is set. If it is set at a level which, from the perspective of credit 
providers, allows the sector to remain profitable, then credit providers will continue to 
operate, although the number of credit providers may reduce (smaller firms may not be able 
to continue operating). Furthermore, in some cases, reducing credit access may actually be an 
objective of IRR, as a means of reducing over-indebtedness.  
 
7.1.3 Over-indebtedness  
 
The stakeholder survey of experts included as part of the 2010 EU study ranked IRR as the 
second most effective policy measure in reducing over-indebtedness (with responsible lending 
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ranked as the most effective policy measure). In addition, products with significantly higher 
interest rates were mentioned as possible drivers of over-indebtedness by experts in Estonia, 
Czech Republic, Austria, Ireland, Denmark and Finland. Latvia reported that the absence of 
regulation and control mechanisms led to a significant rise in over-indebtedness in the 
country (iff/ZEW, 2010).  
However, using a number of proxy indicators (arrears on mortgage or rent, utility bills or hire 
purchase, arrears on hire purchases or loans and the ability to make ends meet) from the EU 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) to assess the level of over-indebtedness, the 
same study concluded that it does not appear that the level of over-indebtedness is 
predominantly related to the regime of IRR. The views of expert stakeholders also suggest 
that overall, the problem of over-indebtedness is perceived as equally strong in countries with 
and without IRR. Literature on over-indebtedness shows that - rather than IRR - the main 
reasons for over-indebtedness are reported to be a loss or reduction in 
income/unemployment, divorce/relationship breakdown, illness and poor household 
management (Kempson 2002, Jentzceh and Riestra 2006). Other reasons cited for over-
indebtedness were increased living costs and an overestimation of ability to repay, with only 
20% of cases attributed to excessive and irresponsible borrowing (iff/ZEW, 2010). 
An IRR will likely force a high-cost credit provider to re-examine its business model, to assess 
how to maintain its profits in a tightened regulatory environment. The relatively high rate of 
delinquency on home credit suggests that affordability assessments could be more rigorous. 
Limiting the interest rate charged could force moneylending firms to more closely assess a 
borrower’s ability to repay to offset the reduction in profits that a cap would impose. One 
possible outcome is a closer consideration of a borrower’s ability to repay as a means of 
maintaining a low ratio of impairment to revenue, which could mean that those at risk of 
over-indebtedness may be refused credit, which could serve to limit a borrower’s financial 
difficulties in the long run.  As discussed in Section 6.2, data from Poland showed that 
households indebted to personal loan companies (which includes home credit companies, 
lending companies with branches/outlets and online lending companies) assign a larger 
proportion of their net monthly income to repay their debt than the households with debts to 
other institutions. Similarly, the Australian Government has noted that high-cost credit (in this 
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case, payday loans) can put consumers on the path of financial exclusion when repayments 
consumer a greater portion of their income.    
 
7.1.4 Illegal moneylending  
 
A research survey undertaken for Policis in 2003 and referenced by them in a report on illegal 
moneylending three years later, concluded that the lower incidence of illegal lending in the UK 
(compared to France and Germany) was due to higher risk borrowers in the UK having more 
legal credit options (Policis 2006). The report concluded that usury ceilings in Germany and 
France had led to a high degree of exclusion from small loans for poor people because interest 
rate restrictions resulted in providers of loan products for low-income households 
withdrawing from countries with restrictions. Several UK provider associations, home credit 
providers and commercial banks reference the Policis report in their assertion that interest 
rate restrictions will result in an increase in illegal moneylending. However, concerns have 
been raised about the validity of the results in the Policis report. The New Economics 
Foundation (2009) notes that the Policis study does not fully disclose its methodology of how 
the sample of respondents was chosen, how many people replied from the individual 
countries and how the questions were asked. In addition, the report did not include a copy of 
the questionnaire that was issued. It is also noted that the report assumes that credit demand 
is uniform across countries, although this assumption is unlikely to hold true due to different 
credit cultures in the three countries (iff/ZEW, 2010). 
The majority of respondents to the EU 2010 study acknowledged that illegal lending may 
happen in their countries. It is interesting to note that illegal moneylending is deemed more 
likely to be significant/maybe significant in countries without IRR by the respondents, 
suggesting that the level of illegal lending may be more pronounced in countries without IRR.  
Overall, 80% of respondents (providers, provider associations, consumer organisations, 
regulators and others) believed that the introduction of IRR would lead to an increase in illegal 
moneylending. However, while this belief is unanimous amongst provider associations, about 
50% of consumer organisations and one third of the ‘other’ category of respondents (which 
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includes regulators) believe that an IRR of twice the market average would not increase illegal 
lending to low-income communities (iff/ZEW, 2010). 
It should be borne in mind that all of the above is based on expert opinion rather than 
empirical evidence. However, it does indicate that the often quoted assertion that IRR leads to 
an increased market in illegal lending is disputable.  
It is plausible that a proportion of the 24% of respondents to the 2013 Central Bank study who 
said they would go to another moneylender or don’t know where they would source credit (if 
their current moneylender ceased operating) could revert to an illegal moneylender, given 
that 13% of respondents were aware of illegal moneylenders operating in their area. 
However, there is no empirical and undisputed evidence that interest rate restrictions result 
in an increase in illegal moneylending. In the UK, it was feared that the price caps on payday 
loans would push a large percentage of people towards illegal moneylending. However, 
Citizens Advice has said that the caps on payday loans has not led to an increase in illegal 
moneylending, with analysis of debts held by Citizens Advice clients showing that the number 
of loan shark debts has remained constant since the introduction of the cap. The iff/ZEW 
report (2010, p. 269) concluded that:  
“To our knowledge, the question if and to what extent customers enter the illegal 
market due to interest rate restrictions has not yet been empirically answered”.  
 
7.2 Economic impacts – supply of credit 
 
7.2.1 Cost of credit  
 
The 2010 EU study concluded that IRR could bring the level of interest charged by monopolists 
down to a more competitive level, but the lack of micro data on individual credit costs before 
and after the introduction of IRR made it difficult to test this hypothesis. However, the 
stakeholder survey carried out as part of the study found that IRR was ranked as the most 
effective policy measure in reducing the cost of credit (iff/ZEW, 2010). 
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However, the rules on payday loans introduced in the UK in 2015 (which include restrictions 
on the interest rate and total cost of credit) resulted in an average drop in loan charges of £40 
(FCA, 2016).  
Provided care is taken to ensure that regulations cannot be circumvented with the 
introduction of other fees and charges, restricting the cost of credit will mean that borrowers 
pay less. 
7.2.2 Competition  
 
In countries where competition is limited (such as Ireland, where the number of 
moneylending providers is limited through the licensing process) interest rate caps could 
decrease oligopoly rates, shifting the price to a more competitive figure and transferring the 
benefits to the customer. 
The effect of IRR on competition depends on the level at which the interest rate cap is set. It is 
likely that the introduction of an interest rate ceiling will result in some credit providers 
exiting the market, thus reducing the level of competition among providers. It is also likely 
that it will be the smaller firms who will exit the market, with the larger firms at an advantage 
due to the scale of their operations. The introduction of rate restrictions and price caps on 
payday loans in the UK in 2015 resulted in the number of firms contracting from 240 to 60 
(CFA evidence to House of Lords, 2016). 
If the interest rate cap is set at a level that is unprofitable from the credit providers’ 
perspective, this can lead to market contraction and withdrawal from expensive market 
segments. There is evidence that interest rate restrictions on microfinance institutions in 
Nicaragua resulted in microfinance institutions withdrawing from poor and remote areas and 
increasing the average loan size to improve efficiency and returns. Similar evidence of market 
contraction after IRR was introduced was observed in West Africa (World Bank, 2014). 
Therefore, interest rate ceilings can in theory reduce competition.  
7.2.3 Convergence at the level of the cap  
 
Interest rate restrictions may serve as a target rather than a limit, with providers using the 
ceiling as a de facto rate rather than considering a potentially lower rate based on the market. 
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While some studies in France report that certain types of IRR may be used by competitors to 
collude on prices, the experience in Poland and the Netherlands does not demonstrate a 
clustering of rates at the level of the interest rate cap (iff/ZEW, 2010). However, the 2016 
review report on small amount credit contracts in Australia noted that the vast majority of 
credit providers charged the maximum permitted fees introduced by legislation in 2012. It 
acknowledged that this might suggest an absence of market competition between providers 
(Australian Government the Treasury, 2016). The likelihood of cost convergence depends on 
the market and the nature of the cap. 
7.2.4 Displacement to alternative credit sources 
 
If access to one source of credit is no longer available, some borrowers may abstain from 
sourcing credit. However, the majority of people will seek credit from other sources. As one 
former moneylending agent in Ireland put it, “people will get credit from wherever they can 
get it”.12 Determining which credit providers displaced borrowers will resort to is important in 
determining the full impact of a policy change. When asked in a 2013 survey where they 
would seek credit if their moneylender ceased operating, 43% of Irish moneylender customers 
said they would go to a credit union, 21% said they would go to a bank/building society, 13% 
said they would no longer require credit, 12% said they would go to another moneylender and 
12% said they do not know where they would go for credit (Central Bank of Ireland, 2013).  
7.3 Regulatory impacts 
 
7.3.1 Circumvention by credit providers  
 
Experience from a number of countries shows that a ceiling on interest rates generally leads 
to an introduction of new charges and fees by credit providers. Non-mandatory costs that 
have been introduced as non-interest fees include insurance fees, guarantee costs, speed 
transfer costs, costs of reminders, direct debit fees, home collection fees and default fees.  
In South Africa, some financial institutions evaded caps by charging credit life insurance and 
other services (World Bank, 2014). In Poland, the 2009 restriction on interest rate charges was 
                                                          
12 Interview with former moneylending firm employee in February 2017 
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followed up with a further legislative amendment to cap non-interest charges in 2016 (Polish 
Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, 2017). 
The introduction of such fees and charges reduce the transparency of credit agreements and 
can negate the intended impact of the interest rate restrictions in reducing the cost of credit. 
However, certain types of circumvention can be anticipated and eliminated by clarifying what 
fees and charges are incorporated within the APR and capping the total cost of credit, with no 
additional fees or charges permitted. 
7.3.2 Opportunity cost of other policy options  
 
An interest rate ceiling is just one policy option for addressing consumer protection concerns 
relating to high-cost credit. It is argued by some that other policy options are likely to be more 
effective than the introduction of interest rate caps, such as enhancing competition, 
improving consumer protection, increasing financial literacy and capability, imposing 
maximum debt-to-income affordability limits, price comparison websites, promoting credit 
bureaus and promoting microcredit products (World Bank, 2014). However, all of these 
policies could be applied in parallel with an interest rate cap policy.  
 
7.4 Addressing the demand for credit 
 
An interest rate ceiling is targeted at impacting the supply side of credit, while the demand for 
credit is likely to remain unchanged by such a policy measure, resulting in what economists 
refer to as a distortion of the market. Addressing the demand for high-cost credit will require 
a supplementary intervention that shifts consumer behaviour away from ‘short-term gain 
long-term pain’ credit options. 
Social science studies demonstrate that, in many cases, individuals make decisions they would 
not have made if they had paid full attention and possessed complete information, unlimited 
cognitive abilities, and complete self-control. At the same time, markets often give companies 
a strong incentive to profit from human frailties, which means products may not always be 
designed in the best interests of the consumer. ‘Libertarian paternalism’ describes a policy 
approach that allows people the freedom to do what they like, while at the same time trying 
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to influence people’s behaviour by ‘nudging’ them in a direction that will improve their 
wellbeing (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) argue that consumers may need a ‘nudge’ from the government to 
steer people towards choices that will improve their lives. In particular, they note (p. 76): 
 
“people may most need a good nudge for choices that have delayed effects; those that 
are difficult, infrequent, and offer poor feedback; and those for which the relation 
between choice and experience is ambiguous.” 
 
While regulation alone may succeed in changing behaviour in some situations, relying solely 
upon the force of the law may not always be the optimal regulatory practice. More effective 
legislation may be achieved by integrating regulation with mechanisms that change individual 
behaviour (Kennedy, 2010).  
 
In the context of high-cost consumer credit, this would suggest that an optimal policy is one 
whereby consumers are still free to choose more expensive alternatives while at the same 
time being ‘nudged’ by the government to consider alternatives that are more financially 
beneficial in the long run.  
 
The G20 High Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection state that the provision of 
financial education and information that deepens consumer financial knowledge and 
capability should be promoted, especially for vulnerable groups, so that consumers can take 
effective action to improve their own financial well-being. 
 
The Financial Capability Strategy UK (2014), in its evaluation of various financial education 
interventions, suggested that the most effective interventions are financial education 
programmes that are targeted to groups, workplace schemes and debt advice. Interventions 
which showed some evidence of effectiveness are family focused programmes, intermediary 
focused programmes and social marketing. Interestingly, financial education through the 
schools has been shown to have limited or no effect.  
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MABS has very successfully combined financial education and debt advice. However, they 
would also see themselves as having a preventative financial education role. Their educational 
approach is one of partnership with key organisations on the ground to de velop highly 
targeted financial education programmes and resources. However, the role of MABs could be 
far more extensive, with greater resources, particularly since they have statutory recognition 
for a money management education role under the Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 2008. In addition, while the main banks are involved in financial education initiatives 
through the BPFI, there is a need for greater involvement of the community and voluntary 
sector, including credit unions, in developing national approaches to financial education. 
Otherwise, there is a danger of commercialisation of financial education. As is often the case, 
the responsibility for financial education is assigned to marketing personnel in financial 
services organisations.  
 
Cartwright (2014) argues that it is necessary to go beyond education if consumers are to be 
persuaded towards more socially desirable outcomes. Social marketing uses traditional 
marketing techniques to inform the public about issues, with the aim of achieving behavioural 
change. It is based on the premise that mere awareness of a problem and self-interest gains 
may be insufficient to prompt meaningful behavioural changes (Kennedy, 2010). Evidence 
from other countries suggests that social marketing might be an effective way to increase 
people’s financial capability (NPC, 2014). FinCoNet (2014) recognises community outreach 
programmes that raise awareness about consumer finance and improve financial literacy as a 
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Section 8: Potential barriers to policy change  
 
The issue of moneylenders’ fees and charges appears periodically in the Irish media, often as 
an emotive argument that laments the fact that those who can least afford it pay the most for 
credit. However, there appears to have been limited public engagement on the issue of legal 
moneylending prior to the political engagement and publicity surrounding the introduction of 
PMC, and customer satisfaction appears to be high, with borrowers reported to be willing to 
pay a premium for the ease and convenience that the moneylending service provides.  
A clear advantage of the legal moneylending industry is that it is legal and therefore 
borrowers benefit from a degree of consumer protection. There is a fear that if restrictions 
are put in place so that moneylending firms can no longer operate, this could push people 
towards using illegal moneylenders instead, which carries much greater risks for the 
consumer. However, as already discussed, there is limited evidence that this will be the main 
default option for people.  
Another potential barrier to policy change is the concern that some people who currently 
receive credit from legal moneylenders may be excluded if the cost of credit is reduced, as 
moneylenders may focus on higher loan values and lower-risk customers. While most people 
already have access to alternative legal credit providers, there will be a small percentage of 
people who may be financially excluded.  
The moneylending industry will not be in favour of an interest rate restriction and other 
associated cost limits if it means their current income is reduced. The industry is likely to 
lobby the Government if any such changes are proposed. The industry has been subjected to 
increased regulation over the last number of years and could argue that the increased costs of 
compliance is already putting a squeeze on their profit margins.  
Changing the status quo requires motivation to do so as well as an understanding of how 
potential unintended negative impacts can be managed. Driving policy change on this issue 
will require both strong leadership and increased political will, as it is likely that any change 
will need to come directly from the Government, rather than the Central Bank. The current 
Government has been active in supporting the development of alternatives to moneylenders, 
with the rollout and extension of the Personal Microcredit Scheme included in the Programme 
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for a Partnership Government, as part of its strategy for the growth and development of the 
credit union movement (Irish Government, 2016).  
Any policy change involves a degree of risk, with a number of unintended impacts that need 
to be managed. The following table outlines the main potential unintended effects of an IRR, 
categorises the relevance for the Irish context, outlines the likely impact on consumers, and 
proposes actions that can be taken to mitigate the risks. Clearly, the existence and promotion 
of alternatives to legal moneylenders, such as PMC in the Irish context, is a central mitigating 
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Likely impact on consumer 
protection (best interests of the 
consumer) 
Likely impact on 
financial inclusion 
(consumers’ access and 
use of legal financial 
products and services) 
Mitigation action 
1 Reduced access 
to credit 
High Percentage of people cannot 
access credit because perceived 
as high risk or unable to 
demonstrate ability to repay 
 
More difficult for over-indebted 
borrowers to use legal 
moneylenders 
 
Legal moneylenders increase loan 
amount/value to offset reduction 
in no. of loans 
Reduced financial 
inclusion - high risk 
customers are excluded 
by credit providers 
Support legal alternative credit 
products for low-income and high risk 
consumers (such as credit unions) 
 
Set interest rate and total price cap at 
a level that enables legal 
moneylenders to continue to operate 
but with reduced risk-based 
impairment and smaller profit margin 
 
 
2 Increase in 
illegal 
moneylending 
Medium  Percentage of borrowers resort 




inclusion - percentage 
of borrowers are 
excluded from legal 
credit providers  
 
Reduced financial 
inclusion - some 
borrowers resort to 
illegal moneylenders 
Enforcement of existing legislation on 
illegal moneylending 
 
Support legal alternative credit 




3 Circumvention High No reduction in cost of credit as - Ensure interest rate and total price cap 
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of IRR legislation other fees and charges 
introduced to ‘fill the gap’ 
is carefully designed to avoid 
circumvention through introduction of 
other fees and charges  
 
Ensure that resources are provided to 
enforce interest rate restrictions 
4 Distortion of the 
market 
Medium Demand for credit remains 
unchanged 
-  Separate from interest rate restriction 
and total price cap- introduce policy 
measures which address the demand 
side 
5 Opportunity 
cost of other 
policy 
interventions 
Medium Resources not given to 
enforcement of other measures 
which could have a greater 
impact on consumer protection – 
improved creditworthiness 
assessments, elimination of top-
up loans, reduction in repeat 
borrowing 
-  Interest rate restrictions and total 
price cap can be implemented in 
parallel with enforcement of existing 
regulations on areas of concern such 
as creditworthiness assessements and 
top-up loans 
 
Interest rate restriction and total price 
cap designed to disincentivise repeat 
borrowing (lower APR/total cost of 




Medium Some moneylending firms may 
leave the market, resulting in less 
choice of providers for consumers 
Customers displaced to 
alternative credit 
providers  (legal and/or 
illegal) 
Set interest rate restriction and total 
price cap at a level that enables legal 
moneylenders to continue to operate 
but with reduced risk-based 




Low Reduction in the availability of 
credit types 
- No suggested mitigation action. Low 
risk in an Irish context. Currently, legal 
moneylending market in Ireland is 
  




quite stagnant, with little innovation in 
product or service over the last 30 
years 
8 Convergence at 
the interest rate 
cap 
Low Little difference in costs of credit 
providers’ products  
-  No suggested mitigation action. Low 
risk in an Irish context – closed market, 
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Section 9: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The legal moneylending industry in Ireland provides high-cost credit to about 7% of the Irish 
population, with the majority of customers being female, in the lower socio-economic group 
and between 35 and 54 years of age. Research in the past has shown that the majority of 
customers are willing to pay a premium for the ease and convenience that the service 
provides, with credit delivered to the door and repayments collected from a borrower’s home 
on a weekly basis. There also appears to be a high degree of customer satisfaction with 
moneylending firms. Moneylending firms offer certain advantages over other credit providers: 
the service is provided at the door, the loans are unsecured, there are no default fees and the 
total cost of credit is capped.  
However, moneylending firms also provide certain challenges from a consumer protection 
perspective. There is evidence that creditworthiness assessments are not as rigorous as they 
should be, topping up loans is still a common practice and the level of repeat borrowing is 
relatively high. A fourth area of concern is the cost of credit, which is the most common 
reason given by consumers for dissatisfaction with moneylenders.  
The cost of credit is an issue that can be partly addressed through the introduction of interest 
rate restrictions. There has been a clear trend in recent years towards the use of interest rate 
restrictions as a policy tool to control high-cost credit in Europe. It can be argued that Ireland 
has a de facto interest rate restriction, with moneylenders licensed to charge up to 188.45% 
APR excluding collection charges and up to 287.72% APR including collection charges. 
However, these interest rates seem to have evolved over time. There is no clear 
understanding of the breakdown of the cost components of interest for moneylending firms 
and what percentage of the APR is attributable to the costs of funds, operating costs, risk 
premium, cost of equity and profit. Ireland is now in the minority of countries in Europe with 
no formalised interest rate restriction on high-cost credit, with this coverage gap now 
addressed in almost all other European countries. Historically, Ireland’s legislation and 
regulation on moneylending has mimicked that of the UK. Now, even the UK is considering 
following up its successful price cap on payday loans with a cap on other forms of high-cost 
credit.  
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While this study has focused on interest rate restrictions, introducing a restriction on interest 
rates will be ineffective unless there is also a limit on all other possible fees and charges, as 
evidenced recently in Poland. An advantage of the current system in Ireland is that default 
fees are not permitted and there is a cap on the total cost of credit. It is important to maintain 
these protections and to ensure that any policy change is designed so as to avoid 
circumvention through the introduction of additional fees and charges, all of which can add 
significantly to the cost of credit.  
Central Bank research shows that the majority of moneylending customers do not consider 
alternative financial service providers before securing their moneylending loan. This can be 
explained by some of the findings from behavioural economics, which notes that people do 
not always make rational decisions that are in their best interests. The main concern of 
moneylending customers is how much they will have to pay back weekly, rather than how 
much the credit is going to cost them in the long run. This, along with the intergenerational 
aspect of moneylending (whereby the next generation uses the credit provider their parents 
used) and the ease and convenience of doorstep credit, explains why most people don’t 
consider the alternatives that are available to them.  
One of the main barriers to placing restrictions on the supply of legal moneylending is a 
concern that it will drive people to using illegal moneylenders. However, the key question is: 
what are the full range of alternatives available to people? As discussed in Chapter 3, almost 
75% of people said they would use an alternative legal credit provider (credit union, bank or 
building society) if they were no longer able to obtain credit from their moneylender. We have 
also seen that many of those who use moneylenders already use other sources of credit. 
There are also alternatives within the moneylending sector itself, retail firms and catalogue 
companies often providing lower APRs and costs of credit than home credit providers. While it 
must be acknowledged that illegal moneylenders are one possible alternative credit source, 
they are not the only alternative and as recent evidence from the price cap on payday loans in 
the UK shows, a migration to illegal providers is not inevitable. Enforcement has an important 
role to play in ensuring existing legislation on illegal lending is enacted when necessary.  
Introducing restrictions on interest rates and limiting the total cost of credit can help protect 
the public interest by ensuring that a fair and reasonable price for credit is provided for those 
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who are typically from low-income households and thus least able to afford high-cost credit. A 
restriction on interest rates and the total cost of credit will force moneylending firms to re-
examine their business model and while this may result in some people no longer being able 
to access credit, there is a high probability that some of these people would not pass a 
rigorous affordability check and may already be over-indebted. It is also worth noting that the 
use of the Central Credit Register by moneylenders from 2018 onwards, for loans in excess of 
€2,000, with all loans over €500 being recorded, could also play an important role in 
improving creditworthiness assessments of such loans. 
Policy and regulatory frameworks that promote responsible lending can limit the negative 
impacts of irresponsible lending on consumers. As a credit provider, moneylenders have a 
responsibility to consider the best interests of the consumer, particularly in relation to 
consumer affordability, product suitability as well as repeat borrowing, transparency of the 
cost of credit and credit-worthiness assessment. 
While an interest rate restriction and a cap on the total cost of credit could make credit 
cheaper for people, it unlikely to reduce the general demand for credit. However, it is possible 
to promote the demand for cheaper alternative credit providers, for example, through the use 
of social marketing campaigns whose aim is not just to provide information but to instigate 
behavioural change.  
Consumer credit plays a key role in the economy. However, it must be moderated to protect 
consumers from any imbalance of power between a credit provider and a consumer.  
Full details of the recommendations of this report are summarised below. Recommendations 
1 to 4 relate directly to interest rate restrictions, with 5, 6 and 7 designed to supplement and 
enhance the first four recommendations, so as to optimise the outcomes from a consumer 
protection and financial inclusion perspective.  
Based on the risks, relevance, impact and possible mitigation actions outlined in Table 7, this 
report makes the following recommendations: 
Recommendations on interest rate restrictions: 
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1. Government to adopt a policy which prohibits usurious rates of interest in the interests of 
fairness to the most vulnerable in Irish society by the introduction of a restriction on 
interest rates and charges.  
2. Such a policy to be conditional on the credit union movement in Ireland committing to and 
being enabled to serve the community currently serviced by the moneylending firms, 
subject always to adherence to prudent credit guidelines. 
3. In consultation with the credit union sector, the Department of Finance consider 
increasing the 1% monthly cap on interest rates for credit unions as per Section 38 (1)(a) 
of the Credit Union Act, 1997, for this type of lending to cater for the significantly greater 
costs associated with such small lending. 
4. Ensure interest rate restriction is coupled with a limit on other fees and charges and a limit 
on the total cost of credit, with the rules carefully designed to avoid circumvention 
through the introduction of other ‘innovative’ fees and charges. 
5. Consider reducing the permissible interest, fees and charges on second and subsequent 
loans taken out by consumers. 
6. Ensure that resources are provided to enforce the interest rate restrictions and price caps 
as well as existing lending practices. 
 
Recommendations to supplement the above recommendations, so as to optimise the 
outcomes of policy change: 
7. Ensure moneylenders engage in responsible lending practices. 
8. Introduce other policy measures, including actions to promote financial inclusion, which 
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Appendix 1: Terms of Reference 
 




It is proposed that research is conducted on the extent and variety of 
interest rate restrictions in the EU with an assessment as to the 
appropriateness of such restrictions in the Irish market.  The purpose of the 
research is to inform any policy considerations and possible decisions and 




The Program for Government 2016 states “We specifically support the rollout 
and extension of the Personal Microcredit (PMC) Scheme, which is providing 
simple microloans to members and helping to combat the use of 
moneylenders.”  The scheme was designed expressly to provide a credible 
alternative to moneylenders. The credit union movement are the body 
providing the credit facilities under the scheme through their network of 
nearly 300 locations around the country. Other key stakeholders have played 
crucial roles in the scheme including the Central Bank, Department of Social 
Protection, An Post, CIB/MABs, Department of Finance and others. Its 
implementation is being managed by the Social Finance Foundation. 
 
The scheme is being rolled out across the country. It is anticipated that a 
majority of relevant credit unions will sign up to the scheme. This is likely to 
happen over the coming 12-18 months. When this position is reached, there 
should be a sustainable credible alternative to the licensed moneylending 
firms, some of which charge interest rates of up to 187% to individuals and 




The rationale for the PMC initiative was to provide an alternative to the 
moneylending firms so that much needed credit could be made available at 
normal interest rates. This is a fundamental element of financial inclusion.  
The number of individuals who are customers of moneylending firms was 
estimated by Central Bank  in 2013 at 360,000 and may have increased since 
then. It is estimated that excessive interest (relative to a credit union loan) is 
being paid to the tune of approximately €50m - €100m annually by those 
using moneylending firms for credit. Providing access to loans from credit 
unions not only can lessen the cost to individuals but also provides the 
opportunity for financial inclusion for those outside the financial system. 
Ireland currently has one of the highest incidences of financial exclusion in 
the EU.  
  
INTEREST RATE RESTRICTIONS ON CREDIT FOR LOW-INCOME BORROWERS    UCC      DECEMBER 2017 106 
 
 
From a policy point of view, a key issue is how to balance the high-cost of 
micro credit versus access to and availability of appropriate amounts of 
micro credit to low-income or disadvantaged consumers. In this regard, it is 
worth noting that while moneylending firms are characterised by high 
interest rates they do offer high levels of flexibility, convenience and 
customer satisfaction. The research will focus on inequality within the 
current lending system, rather than critiquing the broader system of money- 




Moneylending, as defined in legislation, Is the practice of providing credit to 
customers on foot of a moneylending agreement which is, inter alia, where 
the total cost of credit is in excess of an APR of 23%.  Any firm charging over 
23% requires a moneylender’s licence from the Central Bank  under the 
Consumer Credit Act, 1995. The Central Bank  determines the maximum APR 
which can be charged by any individual moneylending firm.  The rate 
approved is influenced by the business case presented to the Central Bank by 
the firm when applying for their licence. In the case of one of the major 
players in the Irish market (Provident), the Central Bank allows 187% APR on 




The option to restrict interest rates for moneylending firms to much lower 
levels, either selectively or across the board, could not be considered up to 
now whilst a viable alternative was unavailable.  This situation should be 
changed in another 12 -18 months’ time with the successful full roll-out of 
the PMC scheme.   
 
There remains a number of challenges to ensure that a credible alternative is 
available nationwide and to persuade individuals to switch from the money- 
lending firms to the credit unions.  However, assuming that project progress 
to date continues and PMC borrower sentiment remains very positive, it is 
imperative to gather empirical evidence to answer a fundamental question:  
What can be learned from the recent EU experiences of interest rate 
regulation/restrictions with particular regard for people with limited ability 
to negotiate for better lending terms?   
 
Aim and objectives 
 
The aim is to explore the effects of changing regulations regarding interest 
rates in Ireland with particular regard for those who can least afford credit. 
The research output will be used as a decision support tool for Irish policy 
makers, to weigh up and assess the available policy options. In particular, the 
question of restricting interest rates charged by moneylending firms to a 
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much lower level than they currently charge will be addressed. This requires 
a comparative review of current interest rate policy in selected EU countries 
(resulting in a concise inventory of policy options), with a comparative 
evaluation of the experience of other EU countries, some of which have 
restrictions and others which have not (resulting in a review of effects). A 
robust comparative framework will be established to manage this process, 
indicatively using a selective case-study approach. The question needs to be 
considered very carefully to ensure that an understanding of potential 
unintended effects of policy change are also identified. This is of particular 
importance to this study given the lack of reliable information on 
informal/illegal moneylending markets (out of scope of this research). 
Indicators for evidence of such limitations on consumers’ access to credit, or 
displacing lending from legitimate moneylenders to illegal moneylenders will 
be developed within the case studies. The approach proposed is to: 
 
 Explore the arguments for and against restricting interest rates charged 
by moneylending firms 
 Elucidate the current situation regarding interest rate restrictions in a 
select number of developed EU countries 
 Provide a concise inventory of policy options 
 Review the incidence of interest rate restrictions in the developed 
economies in the EU and establish what these restrictions are at 
present 
 Evaluate the context for such restrictions with particular focus on 
relevance to Ireland e.g. levels of financial exclusion, scope of 
mainstream financial institutions, levels of interest rates, presence of 
credit unions or equivalent organisations, existence of moneylending 
firms etc. 
 Summarise the rationale for the implementation of interest rate 
restrictions in those countries which have them 
 Address the issues of restricting interest rates charged from the 
perspective of moneylending firms (identifying potential barriers to 
policy change) 
 Evaluate the effects (intended and unintended) of interest rate 
restrictions on those with low levels of income 
 Summarise the situation in a small number of developed countries 
outside the EU 
 Assess Ireland’s situation in the context of the EU countries studied 
 Draw conclusions on the Irish context and make recommendations for 
consideration by the relevant stakeholders 
 Provide evidence that will limit the potential unintended effects of 
policy change in Ireland. 
 As part of the examination of IRR the matter of regulation reform will 
also be considered.  Where IRR exists, and where a licensed money- 
lending sector exists, is this accompanied by regulation reform?   If yes, 
were these measures introduced in tandem and is there any high level 
evidence of enforceability.    The term reform refers to additional 
  
INTEREST RATE RESTRICTIONS ON CREDIT FOR LOW-INCOME BORROWERS    UCC      DECEMBER 2017 108 
 
regulation and restrictions around items such as roll-overs, advertising, 
cold calling and affordability. 
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Ireland  Central Bank of Ireland Bernie Mooney  
Joe Donnelly 
Toni Mc Intyre 
 
MABS Annmarie O’ Connor 
Carol Dunne 
Nigel Hugo 
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Irish League of Credit Unions  Dave Matthews  
Dave Hewson 
St. Anthony’s Credit Union Louise Shields 
Other Former moneylending firm employee 
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UK  Centre for Responsible Credit Damon Gibbons 
Toynbee Hall Carl Packman 
Citizens Advice Joe Lane 
Consumer Finance Association Russell Hamblin Boone 
Financial Conduct Authority Luke Tyrell 
Your Credit Union Jonathon Read 
Poland Polish CU movement Izabela Rutkowska 
Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection 
Aleksandra Mrozowska 
College of Management and Finance Malgorzata Iwanicz-Drozdowska 
PwC Mateusz Walewsk 
KPF Andrzej Roter 
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SKOK  Wiktor Kaminski 
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Ministry of Economy, Service Public 
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Karin Swinnen 
Test Achats Danièle Bovy 
Cyprus University of Nicosia Christiana Markou 
Estonia Ministry of Justice Kristina Kroll 
University of Tartu Karin Sein 
Consumer Protection Board Kersti Kurval   
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Andrus Aristkok 
Finland University of Turku University of Turku 
Ministry of Justice Finland Katri Kummoinen 
Guarantee Foundation Juha Panztar 
Finnish Competition and Consumer 
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Netherlands NIBUD Marcel Warnnar 
Ministry of Finance Netherlands, 
Directie Financiële Markten 
Martin van Harten 
Authority for the Financial Markets 
Netherlands (AFM) 
Wijnand Van de Beek 
Association of Credit Unions 
Netherlands 
Roland Lampe 
Slovakia Matej Bel University/Institute of 
Savings and Investment 
Dr. Jan Sebo 
National Bank of Slovakia Roman Fusek 
Ministry of Finance of Slovakia Pavol Matyasovszky 
Sweden Umea University Ann-Sofie Henrikson 
Ministry of Finance Sweden  
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Daniel Fast 
Swedish Consumer Agency 
(Konsumentverket) 
Anna Hult 
Spain University of León Dr. Elena Perez Carrillo 
ADICAE Fernando Herrero 
CECU Cesar Diaz 
Bulgaria Economic Research Institute, 
Bulgarian Academy of Science 
Iskra Balkanska 





E-MFP Daniel Rozas 
Gabriela Erice 
IFAD Francesco Rispoli 
Michael Hamp 
World Bank Katharine Mc Kee 
Pierre Olivier 
Jennifer Chien 
CGAP Ivo Jenik 
Former CEO of the National Credit 
Regulator South Africa 
Gabriel Davel 
Microfinance Centre (MFC) Ewa Bankowska 
European Microfin. Network (EMN) Jorge Ramirez 
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Appendix 3: Trends on interest rate ceilings in developing countries 
 
Global overview 
The popularity of interest rate ceilings as a policy tool for consumer protection has fluctuated 
over time. A few decades ago, its use had declined globally as many countries moved to 
liberalise their financial policies. However, in recent years, interest rate ceilings have become 
more prevalent in both developed and developing countries. In 2014, 76 countries around the 
world imposed some form of interest rate caps on loans (World Bank 2014).  The World Bank 
is generally not in favour of using interest rate restrictions as a policy tool. This is because its 
work focuses on developing countries, where interest rate ceilings could act as a barrier to 
expanding the reach of credit into unserved or underserved sectors.  
 
Figure 10: Number and Percentage of Countries with Interest Rate Ceilings by Region, 
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South and Central America 
 
The trend towards reintroducing interest rate caps began in South and Central America from 
2000 onwards. In 2000, Colombia defined a usurious interest rate for credit operations to be 
1.5 times the weighted average of interest rates. Nicaragua introduced an IRR in 2001, 
followed by Venezuela in 2006 and Uruguay in 2007. In 2011, Brazil launched a programme to 
boost microcredit, capping interest rates at 8% per year for loans up to a certain value. El 
Salvador followed suit with the introduction of a cap in 2012 (World Bank, 2014). In 2013, 
Bolivia introduced a new Financial Services Law to replace the previous 1993 banking law, 
which included interest rate controls for different loan types, subject to annual review by the 
government. The interest rate for microfinance loans was capped at 11.5% (Heng, 2015). 
Asia 
 
In Asia, a number of countries have recently introduced or tightened interest rate caps. Japan 
reduced its interest rate cap to 20% in 2006 (following incremental reductions from a high of 
73% in 1983). In 2011, Myanmar implemented a new law to cap interest rates for microloans 
at 2.5% per month or 30% per year. Bangladesh introduced an interest rate ceiling of 27% on 
microcredit loans in 2011. In 2013, the Ministry of Finance in Thailand capped the annual rate 
that microfinance lenders can charge at 36% and in the same year the Kyrgyz Republic passed 
a usury bill imposing a cap on microloans (World Bank, 2014). 
India introduced an interest rate cap on microcredit loans in 2011, set at 26% on a per annum 
basis. Other restrictions include a margin cap of 10-12% above the borrowing cost and a 
processing fee of 1% which is not included in the 26% cap. The cap was introduced in order to 
reduce reckless lending and over-indebtedness, and to remove inefficient MFIs from the 
system. The impact was a 50% reduction in the MFI loan portfolio (July 2011 figure compared 
to October 2010 figure) and a reduction in bank lending to MFIs. In order to mitigate some of 
the impacts of the cap, experts recommended that the interest rate caps should be relaxed in 
infrastructure challenged or underserved parts of the country, and that new or small MFIs 
should also be given an exemption from the cap (FSD Africa, 2013). In March 2017, Cambodia 
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introduced an interest rate ceiling of 18% on all microfinance and rural credit operators 





In Zambia, interest rate restrictions were introduced in December 2012 and January 2013. The 
policy goals of the interest rate caps were to mitigate risks of over-indebtedness and the cost 
of consumer credit, and to enhance credit access to the underserved. Interest rate caps were 
introduced for commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions. The interest rate for 
non-bank financial institutions was capped at 1.644 times the bank rate. Interviews with MFIs 
in Zambia in the first half of 2013 showed that the market response to the interest rate cap 
ranged from reduced lending or expansion to try to achieve economies of scale, consolidation 
of operations, migration towards higher loan sizes and fees, and some migration to informal 
moneylending (FSD Africa, 2013).  
In November 2015, the Bank of Zambia removed the caps on lending rates in order to improve 
the functioning of the credit markets. At the same time, it introduced consumer protection 
measures to protect borrowers, requiring financial service providers to ensure that borrowers 
understand key terms and conditions, disclose the interest and all related costs and base fees 
on the actual cost of the underlying service. The Bank of Zambia also stipulated that it would 
review fees for reasonableness, to ensure they reflect the actual cost of providing the 
underlying service or operational activity (Bank of Zambia, 2016, Bank of Zambia, 2015).  
Kenya 
In August 2016, the President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, signed into law a bill capping interest 
rates at 4 % above the Central Bank rate. The President stated that the objective was to 
promote competition between banks, with lower rates making credit accessible to more 
people. In January 2017, Equity Bank, the largest bank in terms of customer base in Kenya 
with 10 million customers, scaled back its mobile phone based loans, preferring to issue 
smaller denomination, shorter term credits. This means that customers who used to get 
relatively large loans through a simple process are now limited to smaller shorter-term loans. 
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Banking analysts deem that tightening of credit policies in this manner is seen as a direct 
response to the interest rate cap, which limits banks’ ability to price in risk (Business Daily 
Africa, 2017). Although the cap was introduced to increase credit, credit growth has actually 
declined. 
South Africa 
In South Africa, the 2005 National Credit Act (effective in 2007) introduced comprehensive 
credit legislation which included regulation on interest and fees, reckless lending rules and 
disclosure requirements on pre-agreement quotes and advertisements. A cap on small loans 
that was removed in 1993 was reimposed in 2007, set at 5% per month on short-term loans. 
In addition, the maximum interest rate on unsecured credit transactions was set at 2.2 times 
the Central Bank rate plus 20% per year. Different credit categories were also permitted a 
maximum initiation fee, set at a percentage of the credit agreement (10% for unsecured and 
short term credit agreements) but with a fixed maximum fee (FSD Africa, 2013, World Bank, 
2014). 
Summary 
In recent years, interest rate ceilings have become more prevalent in both developed and 
developing countries. The regions of South and Central America, Asia and Africa all show a 
number of countries introducing or re-introducing interest rate ceilings over the last decade. 
The extent of IRR ranges from being applicable to all consumer credit (e.g. Zambia, Kenya) to 
being applicable only to specific consumer credit products such as microfinance or 
microcredit. When interest rate restrictions are applied to all bank credit, there is evidence 
(such as in Zambia) that they can damage the functioning of markets if they are set at a level 
that no longer enables credit providers to price in risk and actual operational costs. South 
Africa designed very sophisticated regulations on interest rates and fees in 2005, with 
different credit categories permitted different charges. Several countries in Latin America and 
Asia have introduced IRR on microfinance over the last decade. Once again, there is evidence 
that if the restriction is not carefully considered, it may do more harm than good, as was 
evidenced in India, where the interest rate cap resulted in reduced credit in underserved parts 
of the country.   
